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ABSTRACT
Traugutt, Alexander. The National Hockey League Totals Market: Efficiency,
Profitability, and Heuristic Behaviors. Published Doctor of Philosophy
dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2018.

The National Hockey League (NHL) totals market provides an optimal setting to
test the theory of efficient markets. Under the notion of market efficiency, prices of an
asset are reflexive of all publicly available information, making it impossible to enjoy
consistent, above-average, returns. In contrast to the other major professional sporting
leagues in North America, the NHL was the last to become fully integrated into
sportsbooks, thus making it more susceptible to inefficiencies. To date, there has only
been one published study related to the NHL totals market, which found deviations from
market efficiency. The present research builds and expands upon these findings by
analyzing a more expansive dataset, which included the closing total and associated odds
for each contest. Furthermore, the present work analyzed the efficiency and profitability
of the market through five betting strategies, each motivated by common heuristics and
decision making biases. Results indicated that the NHL totals market was largely
efficient, with only one strategy yielding a marginal above-average return. Thus, the
influence of heuristics appeared to be appropriately priced in the market. This is
consistent with the central premise of the market efficiency, in that financial markets are
efficient with regard to any particular strategy or piece of information over a sustained
period of time.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The American people are a “people of chance” (Findlay, 1986, p. 4). Capitalism
in America thrives on the common occurrence of individuals taking chances, speculating
on uncertain outcomes, and determining the profitability potential of investments. Not
surprisingly, these capitalistic activities have shaped the practice of gambling, which has
become an integral part of mainstream culture. In fact, the gambling industry has become
one of the biggest industries in the United States, in terms of both the amount of revenue
generated and the number of active participants (Davies & Abram, 2001). While the
exact number of individuals who wager on sports cannot be effectively determined,
research estimates that roughly 25 percent of adults in the United States make at least one
bet on the outcome of a sporting event each year (Davies & Abram, 2001). This
widespread participation, some would argue, has been a driving force behind the
popularity of sports in American society.
The examination of sport wagering markets has only recently gained significant
academic attention. This lack of prior attention is tied to the negative stigma associated
with gambling and a general reluctance to introduce sports gambling into the mainstream
scholastic model. Despite this, the enormity of the American sports betting market makes
it an ideal candidate for exploration. Studies have estimated that it alone holds the
potential to produce $12.4 billion in annual revenue (Purdum, 2015). The American
Gaming Association estimated that roughly $90 billion was wagered on football (college
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and professional) in 2016, with $4.7 billion wagered on Super Bowl 51 (American
Gaming Association, 2016, 2017a). For the month-long 2017 March Madness collegiate
basketball tournament, an estimated $10.4 billion was wagered by individuals in the
United States. Even in the arguably less popular sport of Major League Baseball (MLB),
American sports fans wagered close to $37 billon over the course of the 2017 season
(American Gaming Association, 2017b). In total, some experts estimate that the
worldwide sports wagering industry is worth between $500 billion and $1 trillion dollars
(Campbell, 2013). While research has yet to provide similar wagering estimates for the
sport of hockey, one can assume that over the course of a season, the National Hockey
League (NHL) betting market operates as a multi-billion-dollar enterprise.
The growth of sports betting has spurred a unique line of research pertaining to
economic efficiency and profitability (e.g., Gandar, Zuber, & Johnson, 2004; Gandar,
Zuber, Johnson, & Dare, 2002). This increase in academic attention has coincided with
growth in the size and liquidity of the various sports betting markets, creating new
opportunities for empirical research. As the sports wagering industry continues to
flourish, findings pertaining to economic inefficiency and profitability become even more
pertinent.
Given their parallel nature, many individuals liken investing in the stock market
to gambling on the outcome of sporting events. As Grant, Johnston, and Kwon
commented, “betting markets are growing rapidly and are no longer distinct, even
superficially, from other investment markets” (Grant, Johnstone, & Kwon, 2008, p. 10).
Fundamentally, individuals who participate in either domain assume the following: a
potential for financial gain or loss with prior research holding the potential to improve
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one’s chances of success. Thus, methods for measuring efficiency in the financial sector
are commonly, and appropriately, used in the sports wagering setting.
Despite the obvious parallels, it is important to note inherent differences between
the two markets. First, the makeup of sporting contests allows for more simplified testing
of market efficiency. In the financial setting, a stock is infinitely lived. This makes the
testing of economic efficiency prolonged and cumbersome. Conversely, sporting events
feature a definitive start and end that is oftentimes realized in the span of a few hours.
Thus, tests of efficiency and profitability can be conducted in a more simplified manner
with an abundance of readily available data (Williams, 1999). Second, sports betting is
largely more difficult and riskier than investing in stocks. As Randall Fine, managing
director of the casino consulting firm The Fine Point Group noted, “a large, steady
company has a low chance of plummeting and causing you to lose all your money, but
even Peyton Manning doesn't cover the spread sometimes” (as cited in Egan, 2014, para.
11). Nevertheless, many of the strategies used on Wall Street are analogous to the tactics
used by sports bettors and thus informed this research.
Utilization of theories and strategies from the financial sector provide a
foundation for examining the efficiency of sport wagering markets. The market, however,
continues to evolve and self-correct. This makes it difficult to develop strategies that can
achieve consistent above average returns. Thus, the information that may be leveraged
from analyses of economic inefficiency and profitability is relevant to both academics
and members of the public.
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Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this research was to analyze the economic efficiency and
profitability of the NHL totals market through the use of heuristic-based betting
strategies. The strategies analyzed were constructed using common behavioral biases in
an effort to provide clearer explanations for any rejections of market efficiency and/or
instances of significantly positive returns. The totals market in the NHL is an interesting
market to analyze for a variety of reasons. First, the fact that there is no true favorite or
underdog makes the testing of traditional biases in their original form invalid, thus
creating new opportunities for empirical tests. Second, the NHL totals market has
received the least amount of research attention in comparison to other professional sports
and even racetrack betting. Lastly, the lack of widespread media attention and low limits
placed on the market makes it ripe for inefficiency, as oddsmakers may underinvest in the
development of precise prediction models, given the small potential losses that may be
incurred from incorrectly setting an over/under line. These points specifically make this
market more susceptible to financial inefficiency in ways not present in more popular
markets.
In an economically efficient market there is no strategy by which an individual
could consistently increase their wealth and utility (Bradfield, 2007). This concept is
what drives the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which is widely regarded as one of
the most influential and compelling theories in finance and economics (Fama, 1965;
Malkiel, 2012). At its most basic level the EMH posits that prices of an asset fully reflect
all publicly available information making it impossible for investors to consistently earn
above-average profits (Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). In contrast to its initial application
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in the financial sector, the EMH has become a commonly applied theory for gauging the
economic efficiency of sports wagering markets and thus served as the theoretical
foundation of this study.
In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of this market, tests of market
efficiency and profitability were tested against five betting strategies comprised of
common behavioral biases. As is the case in securities trading, bettors, like investors, are
known to utilize heuristics, or general rules of thumb, to arrive at decisions more quickly
without the need for extensive cognitive processing. For this study, the availability and
representativeness heuristics were utilized as the basis for strategy formulation. Previous
research has found that inefficiencies in sport wagering markets may be most plausibly
explained by heuristic behaviors and their influence on the decision making process of
investors in situations of risk and uncertainty (L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland,
2015).
Sports wagering markets provide an optimal framework to test the theory of
efficient markets. The literature concerning this concept in professional sporting leagues
is extensive, yet lopsided, with most of the focus having been placed on the point spread
market in the NFL. This has left a gap in the literature concerning other markets, and
specifically the NHL totals market. Moreover, consistent utilization of heuristics to
explain bettor behavior in sports wagering markets has only been empirically investigated
by a few very recent studies. Thus, there is a clear opportunity to utilize these concepts
and build upon the findings of these recent studies to gain a greater understanding of
investor behavior on both a micro and macro level.
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Hypotheses
Two separate hypotheses were considered when assessing the efficiency and
profitability of the five heuristic-based betting strategies. Consistent with previous
research, a two-step approach was utilized in which significance tests of win proportions
were first evaluated for market efficiency followed by similar tests for profitability, when
appropriate (e.g., Sung & Tainsky, 2014; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2000).
Tests of market efficiency were conducted for in the aggregate and for every odds pairing
within each strategy based on the following
HO1: 𝜋 = 𝜌
H1: 𝜋 > 𝜌 or 𝜋 < 𝜌
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and 𝜌 is the subjective win probability of a given
contest from the vantage of the under bettor. When a particular odds pairing rejected the
null of market efficiency, tests of significance for the profitability of that odds pairing
were conducted. Such a test was characterized by the following
HO2: 𝜋 ≤ G
H2: 𝜋 > G
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and G is the is break-even win proportion needed
to achieve profitability. Once appropriate hypotheses tests were conducted for all
strategies and odds pairings, the success of each strategy was determined based on actual
financial returns.
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Rationale
To date, no studies have examined the efficiency of the NHL totals market while
simultaneously seeking to identify the role that biases, or heuristics, played in the bettors’
decision making process. While some studies have sought to address the economic
efficiency of the NHL totals market and assert that their findings supported a particular
bias (e.g., favorite-longshot bias), they failed to provide empirically tested conclusions
for their assertions. Therefore, a central objective of the current study was to produce
more definitive and empirically supported conclusions about the ways in which heuristics
can explain market (in)efficiency.
The widespread popularity of sports wagering in the United States has created a
scenario where many bettors seek to devise some sort of system or model to
systematically profit on game outcomes. The fundamental question of whether the NHL
totals market is efficient, in terms of the lines set by the oddsmakers, has significant
economic implications for both the sportsbook and the individual bettor as an investor.
By focusing on well-known heuristics, more accurate betting strategies were devised and
tested that theoretically account for common bettor biases (which may or may not already
be accounted for by the bookmakers). This permitted more comprehensive statistical tests
to be conducted in an effort to better understand bettor biases and whether their
exploitation can lead to significant and consistent returns.
Delimitations
This study examined the efficiency of the NHL totals market and the extent to
which common heuristics can explain bettor behavior. The methods for analyzing the
data were quantitative in nature and pertained only to the NHL. Given the unique nature
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of this betting market, results can be generalized, with caution, to totals markets in other
leagues or other financial markets. The varying odds structure and the unique nature of
this sport were what drove this rationale. Lastly, it is important to note that the function
of this research was to recognize existing economic inefficiencies. As such, these
findings should not to be taken as an indication of future performance given the variables
and scenarios measured.
Limitations
1. This research operated under the assumption that sportsbooks seek to balance
their books as opposed to taking a vested position in the market. Such an
assumption is consistent with previous research and is necessary to allow for the
calculation of subjective probabilities and for accurate conclusions to be drawn. If
it was assumed that bookmakers did not operate in a balancing fashion, the
statistical tests and subsequent assessments in this study would be considered
invalid. While it would be ideal to know precisely how bookmakers operate, such
information is not publicly available.
2. This study only considered closing totals and associated odds as opposed to
tracking and assessing line movements.
3. The manner in which heuristics were considered and exploited was admittedly
simplistic. It was essential to the author, however, that the results be easily
interpreted by readers across disciplines. The potential for this information to be
incorporated into more advanced models is present.
Definition of Terms
Bettor: An individual who places a bet or wager.

9
Betting line: A proposition, generally involving two teams, on which an
individual can wager. These lines are affixed with odds so that bettors can calculate
payouts at the time of wager placement.
Bookmaker or Oddsmaker: An individual who calculates odds and sets betting
lines; generally operating out of a sportsbook. (The definition of sportsbook is provided
below.)
Closing line: The final betting line offered by a bookmaker before the start of a
contest.
Closing total: The final total line (over and under) offered by a bookmaker before
the start of a contest.
Efficient Market Hypothesis: A financial theory that suggests financial markets do
not allow investors to earn above-average returns because market prices reflect all
publically available information (Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965).
Efficiency: (in sports betting) Is determined by examining if returns to the bettor
are greater than the commission associated with a given wager (L. M. Woodland & B. M.
Woodland, 2015).
Favorite: This side, or total, will always have a negative (-) symbol preceding the
odds. As such, bettors will need to wager a higher amount to win $100 in comparison to
the underdog.
Heuristics: General rules of thumb that are utilized to reduce the amount of time
and effort needed to effectively and efficiently make decisions (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
Informed Bettor: Also known as a “wiseguy” or “sharp,” these individuals deal
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primarily in large figure bets that have the ability to influence the betting market.
Odds: In sports betting, odds are utilized to indicate the probability of a particular
event.
Profitability: (in sports betting) Is determined by examining if win percentages
exceed calculated break-even win proportions, which account for bookmaker
commissions.
Sportsbook: The entity that employs the bookmakers or oddsmakers and pays out
winnings.
Totals Line or Market: A betting structure in which the total number of goals
(points) is the sole determinant of wager outcome.
Underdog: This side, or total, will always have a positive (+) symbol preceding
the odds. As such, bettors will need to wager a lower amount to win $100 in comparison
to the favorite.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The review of literature for this study is divided into five sections. The first
provides a detailed description of the EMH and the concepts associated with this wellknown financial theory. The second segment focuses on two common heuristics;
availability and representativeness. Emphasis is placed on description of the biases
associated with each construct, as these biases are what make each of these concepts
unique. The third section details the basic functions of the sport wagering market,
including basic market constructs and the role of bookmakers. Lastly, to bridge the gap
between theory and practice, a detailed review of the empirical literature concerned with
applications of the EMH and heuristic theories to the various sports wagering markets
will be provided. The review will focus on studies of the totals market in each of the four
major North American sports, as this market is the primary focus of the present research.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis
The EMH defined by Fama (1965) and Samuelson (1965) posits that financial
markets do not allow investors to earn above-average returns because market prices
incorporate all publically available information. More specifically, Samuelson (1965)
detailed that in an efficient market, price changes should be unforecastable, or
unpredictable, if they accurately and appropriately incorporate the information available
to all market participants. Similarly, Fama (1970) elaborated that the EMH acts under the
assumption that prices fully reflect all publicly available information. Under this notion, a
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portfolio built on either technical or fundamental analysis would enable an investor to
achieve higher returns than one built upon randomly selected holdings, due to the fact
that prices fluctuate at random. Any abnormal returns are simply interpreted as an EMH
anomaly (Malkiel, 2012).
The Random Walk Hypothesis
The underlying concepts of the EMH are closely tied to the Random Walk
Hypothesis (RWH), which refers to the mathematical theory of a random walk. In the
stock market, a random walk is used to describe how incremental or short-term changes
in prices cannot be predicted by technical analysis because they are completely random.
Despite this definition, investors and analysts continue to make assumptions regarding
short-term future price movements.
As an illustrative example, consider the following. Envision standing at the
midpoint of a line drawn on the ground. Using a fair coin, flip the coin ten times and if
comes up heads, take one step to the right, and vice versa for tails. After ten flips,
imagine where you may be standing in relation to your original position. Given our
instinctive nature and biases, we may assume that our final position will not be far from
our starting place, yet the possibility of ending up 10 steps to the left or right is present.
Given the assumptions of the RWH, it is not possible to predict the probability of the next
flip being heads or tails based on the previous outcome. Rather, these events occur at
random and are completely independent of one another. When you get a consecutive
string of heads or tails however, these are commonly referred to as “persistent patterns,”
which occur no more frequently than other instances of chance (Malkiel, 1999). These
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unsystematic movements in the short-run are what economists refer to when they state
that stock prices follow a random walk.
Unlike the applications of the RWH in the natural sciences, Samuelson (1965)
argued that randomness in the stock market is achieved by the active participation of
investors who seek to acquire greater wealth. This is a central component of market
efficiency and randomness; the assumption that investors seek to obtain greater wealth
through their participation in the market. Given their motivated involvement, investors
may utilize any and all information that has the potential to provide them with an
advantage. In doing so, this information is incorporated into the market prices, which
quickly eliminates any profitable opportunities. If such a process occurs instantaneously,
then prices must, by way of this incorporation, reflect all available information. This
suppresses the possibility for profits to be garnered.
Proponents of the RWH refer to the randomness required to achieve market
efficiency as follows: “the more efficient the market, the more random the sequence of
price changes generated by such a market, and the most efficient market of all is one in
which price changes are completely at random and unpredictable” (Lo & MacKinlay,
1999, p. 4). Note that randomness, in this sense, refers to a “well-functioning and
efficient market rather than an irrational one” (Malkiel, 2012, p. 79). It is with this
understanding that Fama (1970) encapsulated this concept in his statement that “prices
fully reflect all publicly available information” (p. 383).
Studies concerned with utilizing the RWH to explain market efficiency have
fallen subject to a host of criticisms. Most notably, Lo and MacKinlay (1999) argue that
utilizing the RWH to explain market efficiency is not economically appropriate under all
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scenarios. Only under certain situations (e.g., risk neutrality), are the two concepts
interrelated and equivalent. Moreover, as LeRoy (1973) and Lucas (1978) highlight, the
RWH is not a sufficient concept for explaining the efficiency of security prices. Their
claims are supported by more recent findings indicating that in the short-term, there is
evidence of momentum-based inefficiencies in the stock market (Carhart, 1997;
Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Lo & MacKinlay, 1999; Rendelman, Jones, & Latane, 1982;
Shiller, 2015). These inefficiencies are thought to be a byproduct of the psychological
biases of each investor. Notably, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that investors are
subject to bouts of optimism and pessimism, depending on the current health of their
portfolio. This causes prices to shift from their fundamental values before eventually
regressing back to the mean. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) link this reaction to the
overreaction that is common of many well-known heuristics. Thus, a contrarian strategy
of investing may be the most lucrative as it capitalizes on investor biases.
Despite these objections, a litany of empirical evidence from multiple time series
models supports the notion that prices follow a random walk and that price changes occur
at random (Cowles & Jones, 1937; Granger & Morgenstern, 1963; Kendall, 1953;
Osborne, 1977; Roberts, 1959; Working, 1960). Roll (1992) concludes that true market
inefficiency, such as momentum-based inefficiency, should be an exploitable opportunity
for an investor. In the absence of these opportunities, it becomes difficult to definitively
state that prices are non-random and that they do not incorporate all available
information. As Roll (1992) succinctly states, “real money investment strategies [do not]
produce the results that academic papers say they should” (p. 28). Malkiel (1999) furthers
this sentiment, concluding that movements in the stock market, as well as those
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concerned with individual stocks, are as random as flips of a fair coin. Taken to a greater
extreme, “it means that a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at a newspaper’s financial
pages could select a portfolio that would do just as well as one carefully selected by the
experts” (Malkiel, 1999, p. 24). Thus, neither historical information nor findings from
technical analysis can be used to forecast outcomes or values in the market, which would
theoretically render it efficient.
Humans prefer order, not randomness. Despite what the RWH posits, it is
commonplace for individuals to search for patterns among truly random events (e.g.,
stock prices, casino game odds, and sports wagering outcomes). Given the contradictory
nature of the empirical results, it is difficult to come to a definitive conclusion that
accounts for these two concepts. Nevertheless, it is evident that academic applications of
the RWH and the concept of market efficiency have the potential to provide findings that
are applicable to both the academic and the practitioner. In particular, the RWH can be
used as a tool to determine the randomness of prices. Based on this information, initial
conclusions can be drawn regarding market efficiency.
Testable Variations of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis
In 1970, Fama proposed a categorized version of the EMH. This included three
distinct variations of the hypothesis that depend on the type of information believed to be
reflected in the current asset prices (see also Fama, 1991). These three forms are defined
as follows: weak, semistrong, and strong. In the weak form of the hypothesis, current
prices fully incorporate all information contained in price history and trade volume. In the
weak form, historical patterns in the market are believed to have been already exploited
to predict future price movement. In the semistrong form, all foundational information
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about the individual companies, or the market, is accounted for in current prices without
delay. Thus, individuals cannot capitalize upon certain pieces of news because all
publicly available information will already be included in the company’s stock valuation.
Note that as traders capitalize on certain pieces of information that they feel will provide
them with an advantage, this becomes incorporated into the market prices and thus the
potential profitable opportunity disappears. Studies concerned with determining whether
publicly available information can be exploited to improve investment performances are
generally viewed as tests of the semistrong form (Malkiel, 2012). Lastly, the strong form
of the hypothesis asserts that while all that is known is already included in market prices,
everything that is knowable has already been incorporated into market prices. Under this
form of the hypothesis, even insider trading will not allow traders to achieve long-term
profitability. All three versions outlined above form the EMH, yet testing of the
appropriate form based on the context under consideration is customary.
Objections to the Efficient
Market Hypothesis
Fama (1970, 1991) provides two thorough reviews of empirical work concerned
with the EMH. He found that while evidence in support of the theory was extensive,
contradictory evidence was virtually nonexistent. Nevertheless, researchers have
continued to pursue various angles to reject the EMH. First and foremost, economists
attack the fact that the EMH is not a falsifiable theory (de Sousa & Howden, 2015; Fama,
1970). Rather, it relies on assumptions of how the market will operate and fluctuate. In
the same manner, it does not provide criteria for measuring efficiency (Alajbeg, Bubas, &
Sonje, 2012).
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Much attention has also been placed on Fama’s (1970) definition of efficiency, or
lack thereof. He asserts that “the definitional statement that in an efficient market prices
‘fully reflect’ available information is so general that it has no empirically testable
implications” (p. 384). This concept has led to a host of criticisms levied from economists
and researchers who question the fundamental principle of the EMH (Alajbeg et al.,
2012; Collier, 2011; de Sousa & Howden, 2015; Lo, Mamaysky, & Wang, 2000). They
argue the only way such information could truly be tested is if the market somehow
provided a subjective timeline of how this information came into existence, was
processed, and eventually came to be reflected in prices (de Sousa & Howden, 2015).
Thus, economists and researchers have more concerned themselves with stock price
movements than with measuring the flow of information. Modern tests are now not as
concerned with market efficiency, but rather statistical analyses that characterize the
behavior of markets.
Furthermore, researchers are apprehensive to accept the general premise of the
EMH and the concept of a truly efficient market. As first suggested by Grossman &
Stiglitz (1980) and noted by Malkiel (2003), “the market cannot be perfectly efficient, or
there would be no incentive for professionals to uncover information that gets so quickly
reflected in the market prices” (p. 80). Further, the EMH is often refuted by referencing
the prolonged financial success of certain investors (e.g., Warren Buffet) and the fact that
the stock market has been susceptible to bubbles and crashes. Given these irregularities, it
seems rational to assume that the EMH is a flawed concept. For example, episodes such
as the 1987 stock market crash, the 2008 housing crisis, and seasonal anomalies such as
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the “January effect,” are all provided as empirical evidence to disprove the theory of
market efficiency.
Given these market crises, Shiller (1984) commented that the EMH is “one of the
most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought” (p. 459). However, the
studies concerned with refuting the EMH are often susceptible to selection bias and fail to
become widely accepted because their analyses are too narrow to permit generalization.
Schwert (2003) posits that researchers tend to focus on results that challenge
preconceived notions or select a combination of variables that will produce statistically
significant results in one case, but are not applicable to others. Overall, as Fama (1970,
1991) found in his reviews of published empirical work, there is little evidence to refute
the efficient markets model. Patterns of inefficiency are never large or steady enough to
ensure perpetually superior returns. This validates the theory of efficient markets
(Malkiel, 2003). Moreover, given that the EMH maintains that as information arises it is
incorporated into market prices, these historical episodes will never again be useful to
investors.
The Influence of Heuristics on Decision Making
Heuristics provide a shortcut with which individuals make judgments given
uncertain outcomes. Generally, these processes lead to reasonable and fairly accurate
estimates in situations where the outcomes are unknown or the mental processes required
to arrive at a decision are complex. The disadvantage of utilizing heuristics, however, is
that they subject to systematic and predictable biases. In general, discussions related to
heuristic theories are concerned with the biases associated with each concept rather than
their sound decision making abilities. These biases generally provide more insight into
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various components of human decision making which permits researchers to better
understand the cognitive processes involved in the processing of information (e.g.,
Borgida & Nisbett, 1977; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
The Availability Heuristic
Instances of larger classes are better recalled and more often utilized than those of
smaller classes (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). More
simply, common events are more easily remembered and referenced than uncommon
events. The vividness of such information may also influence our decision making, as
more vivid imagery or testimonials have been found to outweigh statistical summaries of
similar information (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977). By relying on this heuristic, difficult
judgements based on frequencies or probabilities can be estimated more simply.
To illustrate this concept, consider the following question posed by Tversky &
Kahneman (1973): If you were to randomly select a word from a piece of text in the
English language, is it more or less likely that the word will start with the letter K or that
K will be the third letter? Individuals will assess this question by the degree to which both
instances come to mind. Generally, it less mentally challenging, meaning that instances
are more readily available, to think of words that start with the letter K (e.g., kangaroo)
rather than those with K in the third position (e.g., acknowledge). “If the judgment of
frequency is mediated by assessed availability, then words that start with K should be
judged more frequent” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 211). Despite these judgments, a
typical sample of text contains twice as many words featuring K as the third letter as
opposed those that start with K (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
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This example highlights the process by which decisions are made using this
heuristic and also illuminates the associated biases. Three common biases associated with
the availability heuristic include those due to retrievability, vividness, and imaginability.
Biases associated with retrievability will surface when the size of given class is judged by
the availability of its occurrences. Salience also affects our ability to accurately assess a
given situation based on availability, or lack thereof. For example, when asked if it is
more likely to be killed by a shark or a falling airplane part, most people would answer a
shark attack. Such a conclusion is supported by the fact that information related to shark
attacks is more available and prominent in our memories given then twenty-four-hour
news cycle and creation of shark attack movies (e.g., Jaws). We arrive at this conclusions
despite the fact that the chances of dying from a falling airplane part are nearly “30 times
greater than the chances of being killed by a shark” (Plous, 1993). Such a scenario
illustrates how the availability and salience of an event may lead to false conclusions.
Concurrently, the vividness of certain events may disproportionally influence an
individual’s ability to effectively arrive at a lucid conclusion as to the possibility of an
event occuring. For example, vivid descriptions of events, such as terrorist attacks, may
exaggerate the possibility that such events could occur in relation to a common crime,
such as theft. Since “vivid information is more ‘available’ and easier to recall than pallid
information, it often has a disproportionate influence on judgements” (Plous, 1993, p.
126).
Human mental visualization also factors into decision making, especially when an
outcome is difficult to imagine (i.e., it has low imaginability). If an individual does not
have a memory of an outcome, they will imaginatively generate instances and evaluate
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the probability of the initial event based on those constructed thoughts. If the instance is
easy to imagine, then it will appear more likely to occur and vice versa (Sherman,
Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). Moreover, when an event is associated with
extremely negative or uncomfortable thoughts, individuals may engage in denial over the
chance that such an event will occur (Rothbart, 1970). For example, when asking a fan of
a particular sports team what the teams likelihood of success is in the upcoming season,
individuals will likely provide answers of optimism, even if the outcome is unlikely.
The availability heuristic is central to the understanding of judgment and decision
making. Although definitive conclusions regarding probability estimates are not possible
given the elusive nature of everyday events, the subjective probability and availability
associated with their occurrences guide human judgment. By understanding the ease at
which information comes to mind when one is faced with a making a choice or decision,
researchers can better understand the processing strategies and influential factors of
human decision making (Schwarz, 1998).
The Representativeness Heuristic
The representativeness heuristic is utilized when making judgments or decisions
that are based on whether a situation or event is associated with a certain category and the
strength of this association. As such, this heuristic deals primarily with probabilistic
questions. In evaluating probabilities, people oftentimes rely on this heuristic to
determine the “degree by which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A
resembles B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). In this process, “one compares the
essential features of the event to those of the structure from which it originates” (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). Consider the following example: Max is a very solid and
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muscular dog who is extremely loyal to his owner and protective of his household. His
disposition is fairly serious and he does not often play with other dogs. Would you infer
Max to be: a Labrador Retriever, a Cocker Spaniel, or a Doberman? These characteristics
would lead us to infer that Max is most likely representative of the stereotype of a
Doberman. As such, research has shown that individuals perceive probability and
similarity in virtually the same way (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The
representativeness heuristic is susceptible to arguably the largest amount of biases, as
representativeness fails to account for factors that should affect rational probabilistic
judgments (Plous, 1993). The most notable biases of this type are detailed below.
In circumstances where descriptions of people or events are not available, some
researchers maintain that Bayesian inference is employed (Edwards, 2002; Peterson &
Beach, 1967; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Bayes’ rule is a probability theory that
determines the posterior probability of a given event, A, after data from B has been
observed (Bayes & Price, 1763; Edwards, 1968, 1971, 2002). When descriptions are
added however, prior probabilities are ignored. This creates a conjunction effect, or a
conjunction fallacy, in which individuals perceive that the more information that is
provided, the more likely that an event will occur (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Rationally, however, the simultaneous co-occurrence of two events cannot be more than
the probability of those events occurring separately (Morier & Borgida, 1984; Plous,
1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, 1983). “As the amount of detail in a scenario
increases, its probability can only decrease, but its representativeness and hence its
apparent likelihood may increase” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 98). The
representative heuristic is a primary driver of the unwarranted appeal of more detailed

23
information and the illusionary sense of insight that these details provide in arriving at a
conclusion.
Contrary to statistical reasoning, individuals tend to fail to account for sample size
when utilizing the representativeness heuristic. Termed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1971) as the law of small numbers, judgments are made by the proportion included in
the sample while omitting reference to the size of the sample. Such a concept is a satirical
reference to the law in statistics known as the “law of large numbers,” which posits that
the larger the sample you draw from a population, the closer the average of that group
will be to the population average. A belief in the law of small numbers suggests that a
random sample of a population will resemble the population more closely than statistical
sampling would suggest (Plous, 1993). Such a belief violates the foundational concepts of
sampling, yet is a common bias associated with this heuristic.
The law of small numbers also explains the misappropriation of chance exhibited
by many individuals when engaging in probability judgments. When they have prior
knowledge or experience of an event, people often expect that certain characteristics will
be represented. For example, when flipping a coin multiple times, we expect that both
heads and tails will be contained in the sequence (e.g., heads, tails, tails, heads), as
opposed to solely heads or tails (e.g., heads, heads, heads, heads). When subjects are
asked to create sequences for tosses of a fair coin, the heads/tails proportions remain
much closer to 50% than the laws of chance would suggest (Tune, 1964). The
representativeness heuristic leads individuals to disregard the notion of chance in
predicting events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). This also leads individuals to commit
the “gamblers fallacy,” or the belief that a string of “bad luck” events must be followed
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by a successful outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Take lottery drawings for
example: after a number has been drawn, the amount bet or the degree to which that same
number is selected in subsequent drawings is expected to decline considerably (Clotfelter
& Cook, 1993; Suetens, Tyran, & Galbo-Jorgensen, 2016; Terrell, 1994). Similar
findings have also been presented for the casino game roulette, in which gamblers expect
that a black number is more likely to occur after a string of red numbers (Croson &
Sundali, 2005).
Perhaps the most well-known example involving the law of small numbers is the
“hot-hand” fallacy. In basketball, a player with a hot-hand is thought to be more likely to
convert a basket after one or more successful shots versus having missed the previous
shot. Statistical reasoning, however, suggests that the chances of making the next basket
are not significantly different from the player’s overall chance of making a basket
(Camerer, 1989; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). Detailed analyses of shooting
records of the Philadelphia 76er’s, Boston Celtics, and the Cornell men’s and women’s
basketball programs by Gilovich et al. (1985) provided no evidence in support of the
notion of a hot-hand. Belief in the hot-hand fallacy can be attributed to “a general
misconception of chance according to which even short random sequences are thought to
be highly representative of their generating process” (Gilovich et al., 1985, p. 295).
Nevertheless, players and coaches continue to assess their own abilities and make
personnel decisions based on this fallacy, while failing to account for sample size.
Lastly, individuals often fail to take into account trends of general regression. For
reference, regression to the mean is a statistical phenomenon in which particularly high or
low scores are generally followed by more average scores. Individuals fail to correctly
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account for this phenomenon for two primary reasons. First, they do not expect
regression to occur in the given context, generally due to overconfidence or inhibited
reasoning (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 2015). Secondly, in the presence of
regression, they invent false causal explanations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This
leads to the overestimation of certain performance measures and underestimates the
effectiveness of others. For example, in social interaction and behavior training,
individuals tend to believe that punishments are appropriate after poor performance and
rewards are suitable following a good performance. This common reward structure fails
to account for the concept of regression to the mean, which suggests that after a poor
performance, behavior is statistically more likely to improve, regardless of reward.
“Consequently, the human condition is that, by chance alone, one is most often rewarded
for punishing others and most often punished for rewarding them” (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). People are generally not aware of this concept and thus fail to
account for its influence on the decision making process.
In representativeness, “one compares the essential features of the event to those of
the structure from which it originates” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). In judging
the likelihood of an event based on the observations of similar events, one forms
decisions based on representativeness reasoning. While this heuristic is useful in
probabilistic decision making, one must be aware of the associated biases when analyzing
this process. Failure to account for these biases leads to systematic errors in judgment.
Criticisms of Heuristic Theories
The concept of heuristics and their associated biases have promulgated a host of
criticisms (e.g., Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997; Gigerenzer, 1991; Macchi, 1995;
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Ortmann & Hertwig, 2000; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 1991). Constraints on
the present paper do not provide space for a detailed review, but central criticisms focus
on the general pessimistic account that heuristic theory offers of human behavior, the
representativeness and generalizability of empirical findings, and a failure to account for
ecological validity. A common critique regarding heuristic research is that it offers a
negative outlook on one’s “ability to make sound and effective judgments” (Gilovich &
Griffin, 2002, p. 8). Critics note that humans have “split the atom, recombined DNA, and
travelled to the moon” (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 8), feats that they may not have been
able to accomplish if their judgments were constantly biased. Thus, some critics view
heuristic research as unproductive because it belittles “human decision makers as
systematically flawed bumblers” (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2000, para. 2).
Another critique stems from the notion that research in support of heuristic
decision making may be nothing more than a laboratory hoax. There are a set of
assumptions that undoubtedly accompany participation in a psychology experiment.
These may influence how human subjects behave; participants may misconstrue a
question or fail to anticipate how a certain stimulus will influence judgment, which may
skew results or limit the generalizability of findings. Data may also be influenced by the
effects of “experimenter bias,” which describes the phenomenon in which an
experimenter’s behavior may influence the participant’s responses in an unintended way
(Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978). If a researcher is
more motivated to validate his or her a priori conclusions rather than understand the true
nature of the human decision making process, they may subconsciously pose misleading
questions to study participants. These criticisms illustrate the point that one should be
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mindful of the context and lab setting in question when analyzing and ultimately
generalizing the findings of heuristics-based research.
Closely related to the issues stemming from laboratory studies is the belief that
such research fails to account for ecological validity. As described by Brunswik (1937,
1956, 1957), ecological validity is the degree of correlation between a proximal cue and a
distal object variable. 1 Within our natural environment, these cues influence our
perception and ultimately our decision making. For example, in a test of perception, one
may assess the correlation between vertical position (proximal cue) and size of an object
(distal object) since larger objects tend to be higher in our field of vision (Hammond,
1998). Heuristic research places an emphasis on the identification of the cues that humans
use to make judgments, but fails to assess the true value, or ecological validity, of the
cues themselves (e.g., Schwarz, et al., 1991; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002). To do so would
require the identification of all relevant objects in a specific subject area and
subsequently classifying each object given the value of the cue variable (Gilovich &
Griffin, 2002). Such a task would require a large number of resources thus heuristic
research has placed focus on the identification of cues rather than evaluating the
significance of those cues.
While the various criticisms of heuristics-based research are important to note, it
is evident that findings in support of heuristic theory span a robust and varied set of
contexts that detail human interaction. These findings contribute to useful theoretical

1

This concept should not be confused with the term representative design, which deals
with how well the setting within which the experiment was conducted represents similar
environmental conditions (Brunswik, 1956).
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constructs that help to explain the principles and constraints on the human decision
making process.
Sport Wagering Market
Constructs
Before reviewing the literature concerned with measuring market efficiency in
sport wagering markets, it is imperative to understand the basic constructs and the role of
bookmakers in these various markets. Most importantly, there are a host of parallels
between trading in the financial sector and sports wagering that permit the use of the
aforementioned financial theories. In both arenas, investors, or bettors, with varied beliefs
and sources of information, seek to profit through trading propositions that resolve over
time. Unlike the stock market where prices are infinitely lived, outcomes in the various
sport wagering markets are instantaneously known at the conclusion of a given contest,
making them prime subjects for empirical analysis. Furthermore, in both settings,
participants engage in a zero-sum proposition, meaning that there is a winner and a loser
in each transaction. This allows for further evaluation of the financial impact that the
outcome has on either party.
Lastly, the magnitude of these markets makes them attractive for both investors
and researchers. As previously mentioned, the sport wagering industry is estimated to be
worth roughly $1 trillion. This rivals many of the world’s largest financial markets, such
as the New York Stock Exchange, the world’s largest Initial Public Offering provider,
which is estimated to hold over $1 trillion in market capital (Desjardins, 2016). The size
of the sport wagering industry makes it a compelling avenue for exploration, as findings
have the potential to appeal to a large portion of the population.
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Despite these similarities, it is important to note the way in which these markets
differ. Prices in the financial sector fluctuate and change frequently, where the final price
is set at a level that matches supply with demand. Thus, market makers set prices to
match buyers with sellers. In contrast, oddsmakers, or bookmakers, generally set an
initial price that is subsequently adjusted in small increments to varying frequencies. Two
primary schools of thought have emerged regarding the role of bookmakers. On one
hand, researchers and industry experts believe that oddsmakers set prices that equalize
the number of wagers on each side of a given proposition. That is, they attempt to match
supply with demand to limit their risk and ensure a profit, regardless of the outcome. If
the initial price is incorrect or inefficient, however, the bookmaker may subject himself to
a large degree of risk, especially if informed bettors capitalize on the pricing error.
Nevertheless, bookmakers are believed to incorporate all publicly available information
while also accounting for common bettor biases when setting the final closing line.
Conversely, the other school of thought maintains that bookmakers do not set
prices to equalize the amount wagered on both sides. Rather, bookmakers set prices that
exploit bettor biases. This allows them to capitalize on their ability to predict outcomes
more accurately than the average bettor. Thus, oddsmakers themselves become active
participants in the wagering process. As a result, greater profits can be obtained than if
prices were set in the traditional market sense in avoidance of substantial risk. Give that
there are some bettors who are as skillful in picking games as the bookmakers, dollar
limits on how much money can be wagered are set by sportsbooks to limit the distortion
of prices from reaching a point that could create profitable opportunities (Levitt, 2004).
Thus, one could make the case that the true difference between the financial and sport
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wagering market lies in the ability of a small set of individuals to predict game outcomes
more accurately than the general public. In the financial sector, “the flow of inside
information or the inherent complexity in valuing companies may make it impossible for
one individual to do better than the market, meaning that a market maker who acted like a
bookmaker would do worse than one who simply equilibrated supply and demand”
(Levitt, 2004, p. 245). Such a claim is supported by the lack of evidence regarding the
ability of investors to beat the market over a sustainable period.
Most empirical research assumes that bookmakers do not take informed positions
against bettors. As L. M. Woodland and B. M. Woodland (1994) point out, when
bookmakers do not attempt to balance the wagers, their earnings become dependent on
the outcome of a given contest. Thus, “questions of market efficiency cannot be
addressed because subjective probabilities are revealed only when the books are
balanced” (L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 1994, p. 272). While this study will
operate under the balanced book assumption, it is important to note that two different
schools of thought exist within the various sport wagering markets.
There are three primary outcomes on which bettors can wager in the NFL, NBA,
MLB and NHL: the point spread, which is a bet on a point differential between
opponents, the moneyline or oddsline, which is concerned with solely selecting the
winner in a contest, and the total line, which requires the bettor to select whether the
combined score of both teams will go over or under the line set by the bookmakers.
Hereafter, each of these outcomes will be referred to as markets (e.g., the totals market).
For further clarification, sample betting lines for an NFL game are provided below.
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Table 2.1
Sample NFL Betting Lines
Team

Point Spread

Money/OddsLine

Total

Denver Broncos

–7.5

–110

Over 47

New England Patriots

+7.5

+110

Under 47

In this example, the Denver Broncos are considered the visiting favorite while the
New England Patriots are the home underdog. If the bettor were to wager on the point
spread, he would need to choose either that the Broncos would win by more than 7.5
points or that the Patriots would lose by less than 7.5 points. A wager on the moneyline
would require the bettor to wager $110 to win $100 if he favored the Broncos, or $100 to
win $110 if he believed that the Patriots would win. Lastly, a wager on the total, which is
not connected to either team, would require the bettor to decide whether the two teams
would score over a combined 47 points or under a combined 47 points. If the final score
features a total that is exactly 47, then the bet is considered a push and all money is
returned.
In addition to a basic understanding of these markets, it is also necessary to
understand the concept of a fair bet and profitability. Violation of a fair bet, or an
efficient market, occurs when a win percentage for a certain betting strategy deviates
from 50%, setting the null hypothesis for a fair bet at 50%. For example, if consistently
betting on the home team to beat the spread in the NFL yields a win percentage of 57%
and this was found to be significantly different from chance (50%), this strategy would
violate the null of a fair bet.
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The $11/$10 (–110, 100) betting rule implies that bettors wager $11 to win $10,
known as flat odds. Within sports betting, a flat bet is always booked at odds of 11 to 10
regardless of the market or sport. Under the $11/$10 betting rule, profitability is realized
when a win percentage of 52.38% is achieved and found to be statistically significant, as
initially suggested by Vergin & Scriabin (1978). The following equation details the
determination of the proportion of a winning bet by setting expected winnings equal to
expected losses.
𝑃($100) = (1 − 𝑃)($110)
or
𝑃 ∗ $100 + (1 − 𝑃)(−$110) = 0
P refers to the probability of winning a wager (i.e., the “break-even probability”), and
signifies the probability of losing the wager. $100 and –$110 correspond to the initial
odds on which individuals wager. From these equations, the break-even probability, P, is
.5238, indicating that the chances of a bettor neither earning a profit nor losing money is
.5238, or 52.38%. This figure also accounts for the commissions, or vigorish, paid to
bookmakers by factoring in the initial odds (Vergin & Scriabin, 1978).
While bets in the NFL and NBA on the point spread and totals occur at $11/$10
odds, in the MLB and NHL these lines are posted with an odds adjustment. This is due to
the smaller variance of scoring in the MLB and NHL, which forces bettors to wager
additional money on the more popular side of the proposition in order for bookmakers to
better balance the number of wagers on each side (Paul & Weinbach, 2004). Thus, while
the 52.38% is the standard, the measure of profitability must be recalculated if the odds
are variable.
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Wagering markets are essentially simplified financial markets. Both operate under
the premise that prices are inclusive of all publicly available information, while investors,
or bettors, seek to profit by trading on outcomes that are uncertain. Through analysis of
publicly available information, individuals largely believe that they can beat the market
in a manner that will allow them to enjoy above-average returns. Moreover, sports
betting, much like financial trading, is “a zero-sum game with one trader on each side of
the transaction” (Levitt, 2004, p. 223). Sport gambling markets do provide a unique
aspect, however, which make them prime for measurement under the EMH: they have a
definitive start and end. This makes the processing of profits and losses much quicker
(Paul, Weinbach, & Wilson, 2004). To this point, Thaler and Ziemba (1988) note, “Since
a stock is infinitely lived, its value today depends both on the present value of future cash
flows and on the price someone will pay for the security tomorrow” (p. 162). In contrast,
the payout of a wager is immediately determined once the contest has ended. Thus,
“wagering markets can provide a clear view of pricing issues which are more
complicated elsewhere” (Sauer, 1998, p. 2021).
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and
Sport Wagering Markets
Pankoff (1968) spurned the testing of market efficiency in sports wagering
markets and specifically directed the focus on point spreads. His initial study, which
utilized a regression-based model, found that market inefficiencies in the NFL were too
minute to detect. This motivated a line of empirical research focused solely on point
spreads via a host of regression-based analyses (Gandar, Zuber, O’Brien, & Russo, 1988;
Golec & Tamarkin, 1991; Sauer, Brajer, Ferris, & Marr, 1988; Vergin & Scriabin, 1978).
Notably, Vergin and Scriabin (1978) found reasonable evidence to suggest that the NFL’s
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point spread market was inefficient. However, Tryfos and colleagues questioned these
findings, citing statistical errors that may have resulted in the inaccurate reporting of
profitable statistics (Tryfos, Casey, Cook, Leger, & Pylypiak, 1984).
More recent studies have found clear violations of an efficient market under the
favorite-longshot bias. Well-documented in horse racing, this bias implies that longshots,
or underdogs, are over bet in relation to favorites in the hopes of larger payouts. In the
mainstream sports arena, the reverse of the favorite-longshot bias, where favorites garner
more wagers than the underdog, has resulted in consistent returns to the underdog bettor
(Gandar et al., 2004; Gandar et al., 2002; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010; L.
M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 1994, 2001, 2003). Such a bias is said to stem from
bettors who incorrectly price the contests and fail to properly assess the likelihood of
certain outcomes. These biases may be attributable to certain heuristics that lead to
misperceptions regarding the probabilities of certain outcomes. Studies relating to this
topic have largely utilized heuristic applications to account for bettors’ gambling beliefs,
including the gamblers fallacy and an aversion to accept losses without explanation
(Gilovich, 1983; Wagenaar, 1988). As of yet, few empirical studies have been conducted
that evaluate the degree to which heuristics explain sports gambling behavior in
particular.
While market factors undoubtedly play a role in these findings, adjustments and
advancements in statistical analyses should not be ignored. Instead of the basic regression
model used by Pankoff (1968) and many of the early studies, recent research now uses
more advanced ordinary least squares and probit regression models. These recent studies
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generally include additional predictors and more complete data that allow for more
accurate conclusions to be drawn.
Researchers now have the opportunity to explore less-publicized betting
constructs, such as the totals market, due to advancements in betting technologies and
data availability. The totals market, in particular, creates an interesting avenue for
research, given that bettors have a known affinity towards over bets. As Paul and
Weinbach (2002) note, “psychologically, if a gambler has a rooting interest in his or her
bet and is not just viewing the activity as an investment option, it makes logical sense that
the over becomes a more popular bet than the under, as rooting for scoring tends to be
easier than cheering for a lack of scoring” (p. 259). The remainder of this review will be
primarily concerned with the literature focused on the totals market in the four major
North American professional sporting leagues.
National Football League
Initial analyses of the totals market in the NFL conducted by Even and Noble
(1992) and Gandar, Zuber, and Russo (1993) found evidence of no inefficiencies or
profitable betting strategies within the NFL’s totals market. Conversely, Kochman, and
Badarinathi (1996) found that while widespread opportunities for profitability were not
present, team-specific opportunities did emerge. Paul and Weinbach (2002) carried out
possibly the most extensive study in this market, analyzing totals from the seasons
spanning 1979–2000. While their findings did reveal that the overall market was
efficient, there were instances where profitability could be achieved for particularly high
point totals. Starting with the totals that were set 5, 6, and 7 points away from the sample
mean of 40.3, their results indicated a rejection of the null of a fair bet in all three subsets
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of games for the under bettor. For the games farthest from the sample mean, the null for a
fair bet and profitability were rejected. This finding runs counter to the psychological
underpinnings of most gamblers who view gambling on sports as a recreational activity.
Those who view the game with a rooting interest are more likely to cheer for scoring as
opposed to a lack of scoring (Paul & Weinbach, 2002). The findings of Paul and
Weinbach (2002) have motivated studies of high point totals and inefficiencies in other
professional leagues. The authors do note, however, that such a strategy in the NFL is not
likely to last, given the efficient nature of gambling markets.
National Basketball Association
The market for totals in the NBA has received little research attention. As in the
NFL, Paul, Weinbach, and Wilson (2004) found empirical evidence to suggest a violation
of a fair bet for the highest point totals. Starting with the total line of 200, the totals
measured were increased by one point until they reached 210, which was the last total
with sufficient observations to accurately conduct statistical analyses. For totals greater
than 202, 204, 206, 207, and 208, the null of a fair bet was rejected for the under bettor
(Paul et al., 2004). For the same totals however, no evidence was found to reject the null
of no profitability. Much like in the NFL, the psychological preference of bettors to
wager on the over should be noted.
Given that the totals market in both the NFL and NBA operate with an identical
flat-odds structure, this highlights the question of why informed bettors do not adopt a
contrarian approach to the public and drive the total line back to its efficient value. The
economic answer may be found in the limits placed on the different markets. In the NFL
totals market, limits on single bets can vary between $2,000 and $5,000, while in the
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NBA limits average around $2,000 (Paul et al., 2004). As the betting action pours into the
various sports books, lines are adjusted to even the betting on both sides of the
proposition. Generally, members of the public will shift lines away from their true market
value, which creates profitable avenues for certain informed bettors. For example, expert
bettors, or “wise guys,” in the point spread market, where limits are much higher, can
wager enough money on a given side to drive the line back to an efficient value. This
thwarts the possibility for the average bettor to achieve consistently high returns.
However, the low limits placed on the totals markets “restrict the possibility for informed
wise guys to bet a large enough amount to drive the line back to its efficient value” (Paul
& Weinbach, 2002, p. 261). Since per-game betting volume is lower in the NBA than in
the NFL, it is more likely that informed bettors in the NFL market have the potential to
eliminate profitable opportunities that may arise when the line deviates from its efficient
market value.
Major League Baseball
Counter to the flat-odds market structure present in the NFL and NBA, the MLB
and NHL employ a variable odds model. For example, the total line the MLB may read as
follows:
Colorado Rockies at Los Angeles Dodgers: 11over-130; 11under+110
This is commonly referred to as a 20-cent line because the difference between 130 and
110 (ignoring positive/negative signs) is 20. In this scenario, the closing total is 11 runs
with an over bettor wagering $130 to win $100. Conversely, the under bettor would have
to bet $100 to win $110. Given this, Brown and Abraham (2002) found that over/under
outcomes tended to miss in streaks. More specifically, betting that a team’s win streak
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against the posted total would continue was found to be profitable for the 1997 season.
Such a finding was not found to exist in any other season studied. Brown and Abraham
(2002) suggested that this unique result could be attributable to the expansion,
realignment, and introduction of interleague play during the 1997 season, as similar
inefficiencies disappeared for the 1998 season.
This initial study sparked a debate among researchers concerned with Brown and
Abraham’s (2002) failure to include odds in their initial analysis. Instead, they opted to
follow a simple strategy of determining win percentages over 54.5% as profitable. Paul
and Weinbach (2004) commented that the findings should not be considered valid, as the
study failed to properly calculate profits and losses. The implied odds of Brown and
Abraham (2004) took the form of a 40-cent line (uncommon in the baseball totals
market). Furthermore, the authors failed to provide corresponding odds adjustments for
each game, instead utilizing a simple break-even point of 54.5%.
Brown and Abraham (2004) replied to Paul and Weinbach’s (2004) comment by
stating their estimates of efficiency were conservative and that use of a 20-cent line
would have deemed even more of their strategies as profitable. Further, the authors stated
that their original research was concerned with betting on streaks, not necessarily with the
exact amount of dollars won. Also providing commentary on this debate, Gandar and
Zuber (2004) supported the claims of Paul and Weinbach (2004). They maintained a
constant break-even proportion is not appropriate for testing profitability in this market.
They went on to conduct their own analysis, which asserted that there is no way to
confirm the returns for the original strategy proposed by Brown and Abraham (2002)
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without the inclusion of the actual odds. Thus, the findings of Brown and Abraham
(2002) should be interpreted and applied with caution.
Bickel and Kim (2014) is the most recent study concerned with this market. This
study accounted for the issues highlighted by the previous debate by including individual
game odds in the analysis. Little evidence was found to suggest the market was
inefficient. The authors did find some season-specific inefficiencies, but these were
isolated and did not translate from year to year.
National Hockey League
While markets in the NFL, NBA, and MLB have received the most research
attention, the NHL market remains largely understudied. While a host of factors may be
attributable to the lack of previous literature, one contributing factor is the fact that the
NHL was the last of the four major North American sports to be integrated on a
consistent level by sportsbooks (L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2001). That is, all
NHL games and betting lines were not always offered for wagering purposes. Like the
totals market for the NFL and NBA, B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2010) found
that a clear under bias existed in the NHL totals market, especially for high goal totals.
The EMH was rejected in multiple cases with limited opportunities for profitability. The
degree of inefficiency and profitability found in this market suggests that it is the least
attuned in terms of appropriately pricing contests of the four major sports. B. M.
Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2010) failed, however, to account for the odds
associated with each total. They utilized a simple strategy of denoting profitability when
win percentages exceed 52.38%, which has been proven to be insufficient in the variable
odds markets (Gandar & Zuber, 2004; Paul & Weinbach, 2004).
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Heuristic Theories and Sport Wagering Markets
The application of heuristics to specific sports betting markets and the extent to
which these concepts can explain market efficiency and bettor behavior has been
undertaken by a few recent studies (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015, 2016; L.
M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2015). Recall that market efficiency and the EMH
suggest that it is impossible for investors to consistently earn above-average profits
because markets fully reflect all publicly available information with little or no lag time
(Fama, 1965; Samuelson, 1965). These studies examined the efficiency of the season
wins total markets for the NFL, NBA, and MLB. In the season wins total market,
oddsmakers set a line that represents the total number of games they believe a certain
team will win over an entire season, excluding the playoffs. Note that since the posted
odds are only applicable to a single team and not a contest, there is no identifiable
favorite or underdog. Research concerning the NHL season win totals market has yet to
be conducted, possibly due to the lack of available data.
L. M. Woodland and Woodland (2015) proposed several betting strategies for
testing the efficiency of the NFL wins total market. They found the market to be highly
inefficient, citing several strategies for profitability. L. M. Woodland and Woodland
(2015) posited that inefficiencies may be driven by the representative heuristic, in that
bettors tend to overreact to recent information and fail to account for certain biases,
including regression to the mean. Another potential explanation for these profitable
returns may lie in the makeup of the market. Betting volumes in this market are
significantly lower than those in other markets. At the Mirage in Las Vegas, for example,
bettors can wager up to $100,000 on a point spread bet in the NFL. Conversely, the limit
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on the season wins totals market is closer to $2,000 at the same casino (L. M. Woodland
& B. M. Woodland, 2015). These low limits, coupled with the fact that this type of wager
takes at least four months to pay out, may explain the desire for expert bettors to spend
their money elsewhere.
In the NBA, B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2015) found the market to be
more efficient than in the NFL, yet profitable returns still emerged for certain strategies.
An explanation for this finding is that the NBA may attract a more sophisticated bettor
than the NFL. As Reber (1996) posited, “basketball has historically attracted the most
sophisticated sports bettors, folks who are more knowledgeable about the game than
those who bet [on] football and baseball” (p. 309). Sophisticated bettors such as these
may be able to avoid the pitfalls of heuristic-based inefficiencies, such as betting against
public opinion or failing to account for regression to the mean. However, the authors note
that there were instances in which bettors overvalued a team’s performance in past
seasons. These bettors associated past performance with future outcomes, a trait
indicative of the representativeness heuristic.
The authors further posit that the presence of “glamor” teams may provide a
potential explanation for profitability measures. As Egon, Verbeek, and Nuesch (2011)
concluded, “more glamorous teams have a larger fan base and are, therefore, more prone
to attracting sentiment bets. In essence there is ceteris paribus an excessive proportion of
stakes placed on the relatively more popular team winning” (p. 505). In the NBA, the Los
Angeles Lakers qualify as a glamor team and are largely overbet by recreational bettors
whose betting interests lie in entertainment. Furthermore, Flepp, Nuesch, and Franck
(2016), suggest that bettors are susceptible to a loyalty bias, which prohibits them from
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betting against their favorite team. Consideration of the influential power of sentiment
and loyalty biases motivated B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2015) to rerun their
analyses for only the Los Angeles Lakers. They found that bettors drastically overbet the
glamor team, creating a clear inefficiency for the under bettor. These findings confirm the
sentiment bias proposed by Egon et al. (2011) as well as the loyalty bias identified by
Flepp et al. (2016).
Like the NFL and NBA, the MLB season wins total market was found to be
inefficient with opportunities for profitability given certain betting strategies. B. M.
Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2016) found that bettors exhibited a clear tendency to
overvalue a team’s performance in a previous season, especially if they achieved a
winning record. Much like the NFL season wins total market, bettors failed to account for
the regression to the mean concept. These mispriced strategies yielded results that were
stronger than those for the NBA, yet weaker than those in the NFL. Successful strategies
were generally limited to the under bettor, which is consistent with previous research
indicating that the bettors prefer the over wager when it comes to the totals market (Paul
& Weinbach, 2002). In the season wins total market, instead of cheering for points,
bettors root for wins, which may contribute to these inefficiencies.
Sports wagering markets provide an optimal framework to test the theory of an
efficient market. The literature concerning market efficiency in the professional sporting
leagues has been extensive, yet lopsided. Much of the research has focused on the point
spread market in the NFL, which has left a gap in the literature concerning other markets,
specifically the various totals markets. Although minimally studied, these markets appear
to feature a level of inefficiency with trace opportunities to achieve profitability,
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especially for high point/goal totals. Though largely overlooked, the totals market
provides an optimal setting within which to measure market efficiency where complete
data has become readily available. Furthermore, the NHL, in comparison to the NFL,
NBA, and MLB, has experienced the most significant changes to its league structure
through the formation of new teams, realignment of conferences, and the creation of four
separate intra-conference divisions (Pacific, Central, Metropolitan, and Atlantic). These
changes may contribute to more recent inefficiencies not captured by previous studies.
Thus, a clear opportunity exists to further examine this market to uncover potential
inefficiencies.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This study focused primarily on semistrong tests of market efficiency. That is,
tests were conducted based on both historical and readily available public information.
As described in Chapter II, Fama (1970) proposed three variations of the EMH: weak,
semistrong, and strong. The semistrong form of the EMH is inclusive of the weak form,
in that current prices are independent of past prices. For the purposes of the present study,
it was assumed that bookmakers set prices to balance wagers (as opposed to taking a
vested position against bettors). Given this assumption, it was possible to draw
conclusions regarding market efficiency and expected returns. As L. M. Woodland and
Woodland (1994) noted, unbalanced books cannot be used to study market efficiency
“because subjective probabilities are revealed only when the books are balanced” (p. 272,
note 7).
A previous study concerned with measuring market efficiency in the NHL totals
market found evidence of an under-bias, especially for high goal totals. That is, bettors
preferred to wager on the over, which created profitable opportunities for the under bettor
(B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010). Similar under-biases were also reported for
the NFL and NBA (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 2004). More specifically, Paul &
Weinbach (2002) noted, “psychologically … it makes logical sense that the over becomes
a more popular bet than the under, as rooting for scoring tends to be easier than cheering
for a lack of scoring” (p. 259). These findings informed the present study on a
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foundational level. Five strategies were then devised based on publicly available
information and common behavioral biases (e.g., heuristics). Statistically, this analysis
was concerned with significance tests of win proportions from the vantage of the under
bettor. Once these initial win proportions were computed and assessed, more in-depth
tests that focused on expected returns were completed.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into the following sections: (1) betting
strategies, (2) data, (3) variables, (4) hypotheses and statistical analyses. The first section
lists the betting strategies that were tested in this study. When appropriate, the heuristic
that informed the particular strategy will be identified. Next, a description of the data is
provided to frame the scope of the study. The variables section provides a description of
all variables to be considered and calculated. Lastly, the final section outlines the
hypotheses that were tested, and statistical analyses utilized, to conduct the tests of
market efficiency and profitability.
Betting Strategies
The following strategies formed the basis of this research and were largely
motivated by the availability and representativeness heuristics. When appropriate, the
heuristic associated with a specific strategy will be identified and explained.
− Strategy 1 – Cumulative Outcomes: Bet the under for all games, regardless of odds.
Such a strategy is commonly investigated by studies concerned with totals betting
(e.g., Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 2004). Moreover, this strategy tested
whether bettors in this market exhibited a similar behavior to those in the NFL (Paul
& Weinbach, 2002) and NBA (Paul et al., 2004), and NHL (B. M. Woodland & L.
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M. Woodland, 2010) in that a preference for scoring creates profitable opportunities
for the under bettor.
− Strategy 1a: Further examination of Strategy 1 for each closing total.
Reminder, the closing total is the final betting line (e.g., over/under and
odds pairing) offered before the start of a game.
− Strategy 1b: Bet the under whenever the over closing total odds were
favored in relation to the under odds. This approach simply segmented the
population further in an attempt to uncover inefficiencies related to
previously documented under-biases.
− Strategy 2 – The Hot-Hand Fallacy: Bet the under in games that featured two teams
with an at or above .500 average against the over total in their previous five games.
This strategy was concerned with the representativeness heuristic and the likelihood
of bettors to associate past outcomes with future events. Therefore, inefficiencies
may be attributable to the hot-hand fallacy and failure to account for general
regression concepts.
− Strategy 3 – The Glamor Effect: Bet the under in games that featured one or two
glamor teams. That is, teams that ranked in the top 15 in terms of popularity
(variables related to popularity are detailed below). This strategy was grounded in
the representative heuristic and, more specifically, sentiment bias, wherein bettors
tend to overvalue more popular teams.
− Strategy 4 – Playoff Success and Recency Bias: Bet the under in all games that
featured one or two playoff teams from the previous year. This strategy was
concerned with the availability heuristic and the tendency for bettors to exude a
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recency bias. This may lead to inflated totals as bettors may overvalue the scoring
potential of these playoff teams thus skewing closing totals.
− Strategy 5 – The Conjunction Fallacy: Bet the under in all games that featured one or
two teams ranked in the top 15 in terms of analytic variable average in the previous
season. Inefficiencies may be explained by the conjunction fallacy and the
perception that the more information that is provided, the more likely a specific
event will occur.
Data
The data utilized for this study was drawn from multiple sources. All game and
betting-specific information was obtained from oddswarehouse.com, a website dedicated
to providing historical sports betting odds. Playoff teams were identified based on
information readily available from NHL.com. Analytic rankings were gathered from
hockey-reference.com. Glamor team rankings were assigned based on a fan engagement
analysis conducted by Lentile (2013).
The seasons studied for this analysis spanned from 2011/12 to 2016/17. This
timeframe was selected as it featured consistency regarding the number and location of
teams. More specifically, in 2011 the Atlanta Thrashers relocated and became the
Winnipeg Jets. After this move, no relocation or expansion teams emerged during the
sample period. Thus, to avoid any statistical errors or biases concerned with team
relocation, the 2011/12 season was deemed an appropriate starting place.
In total, 6,105 regular season games made up the sample less all push bets and
playoff games. Push bets (n = 761) were excluded because there was no true winner from
a gambling perspective. Recall, these outcomes occur when the combined number of
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goals scored equals the closing total. Playoff games (n = 528) were excluded for two
reasons. First, their inclusion held the potential to create additional biases and/or
inefficiencies not accounted for in this study. Second, these potential biases could not be
deduced without additional statistical procedures that were beyond the scope of the
present study.
Variables
To appropriately gauge the efficiency and profitability of this market, a host of
variables and calculated statistics were assessed. Table 3.1 provides a listing of all
variables drawn from the data sources, along with their corresponding notation and a
brief description. Note that the combination of Under Close Odds (UCL) and Over Close
Odds (OCL) are what form odds pairings.
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Table 3.1
Data Source Variables
Variable

Notation

Description

Home/Away Team
Home Score
Away Score
Closing Total Line
Under Close Odds
Over Close Odds
Total Score
Betting Outcome

HT/AT
HS
AS
CL
UCL
OCL
TS
BO

Coded 1-30 in alphabetical order by city.
Total number of goals scored by the home team.
Total number of goals scored by the away team.
Closing total line set by bookmakers.
Odds associated with the closing under total line.
Odds associated with the closing over total line
Combined number of goals for both teams.
Result based on the closing total. Coded as 1 for a
winning under bet, 0 for a winning over bet.
Number of wins and losses against the total line for
each team reported as a running percentage.
Indicates that a team made the Stanley Cup Playoffs
the prior year. Coded as 1 if true and 0 otherwise.
Coded as 1-30 and remained constant from season
to season.
Coded 1-30 and changes each season. 17 total
variables were factored into the ranking.

Over Win Percentage

OWP

Playoff Team

PT

Glamor Team
Ranking
Analytic Rank

GT
AR

Three variables require additional explanation. First, glamor teams were identified
using the results of a study conducted by Lentile (2013), who considered five criteria
when ranking the popularity of each NHL franchise: Google search results, franchise
Facebook likes, team Twitter followers, franchise worth, and spectator attendance. The
results and subsequent rankings were utilized for each season in this study.
Unfortunately, no updates to this study were made nor were there comparable studies
done prior to or after 2013, which eliminated the possibility to update the rankings each
seaon. However, it is reasonable to assume that glamor teams, given the seasons
analyzed, remained relevant and constant.
Second, analytic ranks were assigned using aggregated average scores of 17
variables related to performance. The variables and their descriptions can be found in
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Table 3.2. Third, over win percentage (OWP) was calculated as a team-specific running
percentage that reset after each season. More specifically, this figure was indicative of the
number of times that the final score went over the closing total line in the teams’ previous
five games. While it is understood that final scores are representative of efforts from both
teams, it is not uncommon for fans to attribute the scoring success of two teams to a
single team in a forthcoming matchup. The remaining variables were simplistic in their
makeup and are commonly referenced throughout hockey and betting communities.
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Table 3.2
Analytic Variables
Variable
Corsi For (CF)
Corsi Against (CA)
Corsi For % (CF%)
Fenwick For (FF)
Fenwick Against (FA)
Fenwick For % (FF%)
Team on-ice shooting percentage (oiSH%)
Team on-ice save percentage (oiSV%)
Team on-ice shooting percentage (oiSH%)
Team on-ice save percentage (oiSV%)
offensive Zone Start % (oZS%)
defensive Zone Start %(dZS%)
PDO
Faceoff Wins (FOW)
Faceoff Losses (FOL)
Hits (HIT)
Blocks (BLK)

Description
Shot attempt differential for a particular
team.
Shot attempt differential for all opposing
teams.
CF% above 50% indicates that a team
controls the puck more often than not.
Shot attempt differential for a particular
team, with blocked shots removed.
Shot attempt differential for all opposing
teams, with blocked shots removed.
FF% above 50% indicates that a team
controls the puck more often than not.
Team shooting percentage.
Team save percentage.
Team shooting percentage.
Team save percentage.
Number of a times a team starts in their
offensive zone.
Number of a times a team starts in their
defensive zone.
The efficiency of a team’s shots and their
ability to stop the opponents’ shot.
Number of faceoff wins.
Number of faceoff losses.
Total number of hits.
Total number of blocks.
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Hypotheses and Statistical Analyses
Although findings of economic inefficiency are not uncommon in sport wagering
markets, rarely are there consistently profitable opportunities for bettors. Recall that in a
truly efficient market, no formulated strategy should yield higher returns than one simply
comprised of randomly selected wagers nor should there be opportunities for sustained
above-average returns. Given that totals in the NHL are set with an odds adjustment, tests
of win proportions based on a 52.38% break-even win percentage, which is only
appropriate for flat odds (-110, +100), should not be considered valid. Rather, more
comprehensive tests must be conducted that consider each odds pairing. L.M. Woodland
and Woodland (1994, 2001), have been credited with the first odds-specific study of
market efficiency. Gandar et al. (2002, 2004), amended those tests to provide more
stringent examinations of market efficiency. For the purposes of this study, the
derivations and specifications presented by Gandar et al. (2002, 2004) were utilized.
Before attempting to calculate any market statistics, it is imperative that the
notation for favorites and underdogs is understood. Favorite and underdog prices were
identified as 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 , respectively, throughout this analysis. Note that in this market,
there is no favorite or underdog in the traditional sense. These notations were solely used
to label prices, not teams. For example, given the odds (-110, +100), 𝛽1 would be written
as 1.1 while 𝛽2 would be notated as 1.0. These decimal values, or decimal odds, were
calculated by taking the absolute value of the initial odds figure and dividing by 100 (e.g.,
|-110|/100). In some instances, however, lines in the NHL are offered where both the
underdog and favorite bettors must wager more than their expected winnings. This
generally happens when teams are evenly matched, or no clear distinction has been made
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by oddsmakers on the teams’ goal scoring potential. These lines are referred to as doublenegative lines (e.g., -115, -105). In the scenario provided, -105 (1.05) would be
considered 𝛽2 , as bettors would need to wager a smaller amount to win a $100 compared
to the -115 (1.15), 𝛽1 , odds. Now that the notation for favorites and underdogs is
understood, tests of market efficiency can be properly conducted.
To appropriately assess this market and each strategy, a two-step process was
utilized. First, tests of market efficiency were conducted for each betting strategy. Given
that each strategy is unique in its structure, sample size varied depending on the number
of contests that met the requirements of each strategy. However, a minimum number of
contests for each odds pairing was established in order to ensure normal distribution of
the data. These limits are notated within the results tables for each strategy. Regardless,
the statistical analyses employed were identical.
The null hypothesis of efficiency implies that the objective probability of an under
wager win equals the subjective probability of an under wager win. Otherwise, the
expected losses would not be equivalent for both sides. Thus, the hypothesis for market
efficiency is characterized by the following
HO1: 𝜋 = 𝜌
H1: 𝜋 > 𝜌 or 𝜋 < 𝜌
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and 𝜌 is the subjective win probability for a
given odds pairing from the vantage of the under bettor. Given the symmetry of betting
data, it is appropriate to study each game from only one betting perspective.
The objective probability, 𝜋, of a given odds pairing was calculated as the
observed proportion of winning under bets (i.e., number of winning under bets divided by
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total number of games for that odds pairing). Subjective probabilities, however, required
additional computations. For standard lines (e.g., -110, +100), subjective probabilities, 𝜌,
were calculated as
𝜌=

𝛽1 + 1
2𝛽1 + 𝛽1 𝛽2 + 1

and for double negative lines (e.g., -130, -105)
𝜌=

(1/𝛽1 ) + 1
((1/𝛽1 ) + (1/𝛽2 ) + 2)

To determine the significance of differences between the subjective and objective win
proportions, the observed proportions were converted into a z-score as follows
𝑧𝑙 = (𝜋 − 𝜌𝑙 )/[((𝜌𝑙 (1 − 𝜌𝑙 ))/ 𝑛𝑙 )]1/2
where 𝑧𝑙 is the computed z-score for a given odds pairing, 𝜋 is the number of winning
under bets, or objective win probability, 𝜌𝑙 is the subjective win probability which was
calculated above, and 𝑛𝑙 is the total number of contests measured for that specific under
odds line. A two-tailed test of significance was then conducted at both the 10% and 5%
levels.
When a particular odds pairing within a given strategy rejected the null of market
efficiency, the potential for profitability was assessed. This test was characterized by the
following
HO2: 𝜋 ≤ G
H2: 𝜋 > G
where 𝜋 is the objective win probability and G is the break-even win proportion needed to
achieve profitability based on the given under odds. This proportion was calculated as
G=

Amount Risked
Amount Risked + Amount to Win
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For example, given the closing under odds of (-120) and a standard wager of $100, the
break-even win proportion would be calculated as follows:
𝐺=

120
= 54.54%
120 + 100

When the objective win proportion, 𝜋, of a given strategy met or exceeded the break-even
win proportion, a one-tailed significance test based on the calculated z-score was
conducted identical to that utilized to assess market efficiency. The only difference was in
the handling of 𝜌𝑙 , the subjective probability. For tests of profitability, the value of 𝜌𝑙 was
specified as the break-even win proportion for the given odds pairing as opposed to the
calculated subjective probability. This allowed for the test to appropriately assess the
significance of the difference between the objective win probability and the subjective
win probability assumed by the break-even win proportion.
Analyses of each strategy produced a wealth of statistics. In order to provide more
interpretable conclusions, strategies were assessed based on two metrics. The first was
the number of odds pairings that rejected the null of market efficiency and/or
profitability. The second was actual return on investment figures, which were calculated
based on those odds pairings that featured significantly profitable outcomes. This allowed
for conclusions to be drawn regarding the success of a particular strategy from a purely
financial perspective. The influence of heuristics was also discussed for each strategy and
for the results as a whole to provide an indication of their influence on the market and its
outcomes. Ultimately, the results of this research provide a foundation for understanding
investor decision making in situations of risk and uncertainty through the use of wellknown financial and behavioral concepts.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This section presents the statistical results from the semistrong tests of efficiency
for each betting strategy. The purpose of this research was to analyze the economic
efficiency and profitability of the NHL totals market through the use of heuristic-based
betting strategies. The strategies analyzed were comprised of common behavioral biases
in an effort to provide clearer explanations for any rejections of market efficiency and/or
instances of significantly positive returns. Within this context, a two-step process was
utilized. First, tests of market efficiency were conducted for each betting strategy.
When a particular odds pairing within a given strategy rejected the null of market
efficiency, the potential for profitability was assessed. Note that in order to present more
succinct results, profitability metrics were only reported in the results tables when the
objective odds, 𝜋, exceeded the break-even win proportion, G, of the under closing odds
being considered.
For each strategy, aggregate and individual odds pairing results were reported. It
is important to note that break-even win proportion (G) and subjective probability (𝜌)
values were presented as sample averages in Strategy 1 and for the aggregate outcomes.
The results for each strategy detail the results of the aforementioned hypotheses and are
accompanied by return on investment (ROI) figures to illustrate the financial returns of
each strategy. Lastly, conclusions were drawn regarding the efficiency of the NHL totals
market from both theoretical and applied perspectives.
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Strategy 1 – Cumulative Outcomes
There is documented evidence of bettors deriving significant entertainment value
from scoring, especially in hockey where scoring is typically minimal and goals come at
a premium (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010). Relatedly, there is an observed
under-bias in totals betting, given the psychological predisposition for bettors to wager on
higher cumulative scores as opposed to lower cumulative scores (Paul & Weinbach,
2002). As a result, under wagers have been found to produce profitable results in multiple
leagues. The first strategy under consideration was motivated by this evidence. Two substrategies were also tested that theoretically account for additional biases, which included
further segmenting the sample based on the closing total and wagering on the under
whenever the over odds were favored. Complete results are detailed below.
Table 4.1 illustrates the results from Strategy 1, where n is the number of games
included in the strategy sample, 𝜋 indicates the number of winning under wagers, and
𝜋% is the under win percentage. In this scenario, G, which is the break-even win
proportion, and 𝜌, the subjective probability, were reported as sample averages. Z-scores
were assessed for significance at both the 10% and 5% levels. Recall that statistics for the
null of profitability (z_profit) were only reported if the under win percentage (𝜋%)
exceeded the break-even win proportion, G. Figure 4.1 displays win percentages and
break-even win proportions on a seasonal basis in order to present more detailed
information on the nature of this market.
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Table 4.1
Strategy 1 Results
n
6105

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

3104

.5084

.5302

.4587

7.7886**

z_profit

Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Break-even win percentage and subjective probability are
calculated as sample averages.

Win %

G

0.5500
0.5400
0.5300
0.5200
0.5100
0.5000
0.4900
0.4800
0.4700

Win %

0.5394
0.5273

0.5250
0.5265
0.5169

0.5285

0.5240

0.5254

0.5258
0.5167

0.5098
0.4961

2011-12

2013

2013-14

2014-15

2015-16

2016-17

Season
Figure 4.1. Season win percentages and average break-even win proportions.
The results for Strategy 1 demonstrate that the market rejected the null of market
efficiency when all games were assessed. For reference, the null of market efficiency is
rejected whenever the objective win percentage (𝜋) is not equal to the subjective win
probability (). Therefore, the outcome of Strategy 1 is not uncommon given the
variability of the market and the stringent nature of the test. Despite this significant
measure, the win percentage did not reach a level reject the null of profitability. Even
with a significant winning percentage over 50%, under bettors would not have enjoyed
above average, or even marginally profitable returns. In fact, wagering $100 on the under
in each game in the sample (N = 6105 games) would have resulted in a net loss of
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$11,612.44 (-2% ROI), which takes into account the average commissions collected by
the bookmakers. For comparison, returns in the Standard & Poors 500 (S&P 500) during
this same period averaged roughly 12% ROI (Shiller, 2018).
Figure 4.1 further segments to provide insight into changes on a season-by-season
basis. While the purpose of this research was to assess the market in its entirety and not
on a seasonal basis, these metrics provide a more detailed look at the operational nature
and relative efficiency of the market. Aside from the 2013 season (which was shortened
due to a lockout from 82 to 48 games), each season featured a win percentage that fell
below the average break-even win proportion needed to reject the null of profitability.
Even in 2013, however, bettors would have only enjoyed a positive return of $1,713.06
(3% ROI). These results highlight the overall efficiency of this market from a financial
sense. While the null of market efficiency was rejected for Strategy 1, the financial
outcomes and market commissions associated with the closing totals must be considered.
Results for Strategy 1a (Table 4.2), which segmented the sample by closing totals,
featured only one significant measure with no totals rejecting the null of profitability.
These findings run counter to those of previous studies of the NFL, NBA, and NHL totals
markets (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al., 2004; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland,
2010), in that significant deviations from market efficiency were not observed for higher
totals. This finding suggests that this market has become more efficient over time, which
aligns with the central premise of the EMH.
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Table 4.2
Strategy 1a Results
Closing Total

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

4.5

7

3

.4286

.4834

.4686

-.2121

5

2099

989

.4712

.4918

.4617

.8746

5.5

3913

2115

.5405

.5484

.4570

6.5856**

6

74

39

.5270

.5224

.4759

.8814

6.5

12

4

.3333

.5361

.4769

-.9954

z_profit

Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Break-even win percentage and subjective probability are
calculated as sample averages for the specified closing total.
Of interest is the significant measure associated with the closing total 5.5, which
appeared in 3,913 of the 6,105 contests (65%). Despite a win percentage of 54%, which
did not rise to the level to reject the null of profitability, a simple strategy of wagering on
the under when the total line closed at 5.5 would have resulted in a net loss of $3,812.82
(-1% ROI). Additionally, based on the fact that the average total number of goals per
game during the sample equaled roughly 5.5, conventional thought might suggest that
value lies in totals that fall above and below this figure. However, wagering on the under
for each total that did not close at 5.5 would have resulted in a negative net loss of
$7,799.62 (-4% ROI).
Strategies that featured a win percentage over 50%, or over 52.38%, may lead the
average bettor to assume above-average financial returns. The findings from this strategy,
however, illuminate the importance of considering commissions, even in the aggregate,
when determining the financial success of a particular strategy. Figure 4.2 displays profit
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and loss information for Strategy 1a, which provides further clarification regarding
returns for specific goal totals.
$2,000.00
$88.00

ROI (dollars)

$-

$(79.00)

$(452.51)

$(2,000.00)
$(4,000.00)

$(3,813.00)

$(6,000.00)
$(7,356.54)

$(8,000.00)
4.5

5

5.5
6
Closing Total (goals)
Figure 4.2. Returns on investment for Strategy 1a.

6.5

There is a documented tendency of bettors to over bet favorites, commonly
referred to as the reverse favorite-longshot bias (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland,
2015; L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2003). In an inefficient market, a contrarian
strategy of wagering on underdogs could result in returns that are higher than those
implied by the EMH. Thus, the final test within this strategy focused on the potential for
inefficiencies due to these overvaluation tendencies. Recall that in the totals market, there
is no favorite or underdog in the traditional sense. Rather, these labels are reserved for the
odds associated with each closing total as opposed to the teams themselves.
Table 4.3
Strategy 1b Results
n
2241

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

1049

.4681

.4752

.4636

.4301

z_profit

Note. Break-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample
averages.
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Results for Strategy 1b (Table 4.3) yielded no significant measures and featured a
win percentage that did not rise above 50%. Thus, a contrarian strategy of wagering
against the odds (e.g., favorite-longshot bias) was not found to be profitable, with losses
exceeding $2,700 (-1% ROI). Such a result would suggest that betting with the odds may
be a more favorable strategy, which aligns with previous research and human tendencies
to prefer favorites and the favored odds (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015; L.
M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2010).
Strategy 2 – The Hot-Hand Fallacy
A team’s success against the betting line is a common barometer for measuring
team quality. It is also oftentimes used as a predictor for future performance, especially as
it relates to goal scoring (Graham & Stott, 2010). A bettor may view recent outcomes
against the closing total as an indicator of future results and thus wager on the
continuation of such outcomes. In reality, however, these past events have no real
predictive value. A simple example of this tendency may be found in the game of
roulette. Signs above the roulette wheel generally show results from the last twenty spins,
including number and color. If the last ten spins all landed on red, then a bettor may
employ one of two strategies. Either bet on red because it is considered “hot” or take the
contrarian strategy and bet on black because it is “due” (Ma, 2014).
When a bettor bases his wagers on the continuation of results, his decision is
motivated by the hot-hand fallacy, or gamblers fallacy, where he assumes a correlation
between past events and future outcomes. Thus, he may believe that he has an advantage
in the market based on his own cognitive bias. In reality, however, each spin of the wheel
or hockey game played should be viewed as an independent trial (Ma, 2014). Any
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previous successes, or streaks, are likely a product of statistical variance and fundamental
chance (i.e., luck). Moreover, these decisions are often based on small sample sizes and
fail to account for general regression concepts, which statistically invalidate their general
premise.
In an inefficient market, such a bias would inflate goal totals in a way that would
create favorable outcomes for the under bettor. Thus, this strategy focused on exploiting
the hot-hand fallacy and the potential for overvaluation by wagering on the under for all
games that featured two teams with an at or above .500-win percentage against the over
closing total in their previous five games. The decision to utilize .500 as the benchmark
was motivated by common sentiments that use this figure as the break-even point for
determining success in a particular scenario. Since the filter for this strategy was more
stringent, the cutoff for odds pairings to be included was five contests instead of twenty.
The data was first considered in the aggregate and then segmented based on the closing
odds.
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Table 4.4

Under Odds Favored

Strategy 2 Results
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

z_profit

Totala
(-150, 130)
(-145, 125)
(-142, 129)
(-140, 120)
(-139, 126)
(-138, 125)
(-137, 124)
(-136, 124)
(-135, 115)
(-135, 123)
(-135, 125)
(-133, 120)
(-133, 121)
(-132, 120)
(-131, 119)
(-130, 110)
(-130, 118)
(-129, 117)
(-128, 116)
(-127, 115)
(-126, 114)
(-125, 105)
(-125, 113)
(-125, 115)
(-124, 113)
(-123, 111)
(-123, 112)
(-121, 110)
(-120, 100)
(-120, 109)
(-120, 110)
(-119, 108)
(-118, 107)
(-117, 106)
(-116, 105)
(-105, -105)
(-115, -105)
(-115, 104)
(-114, 103)

1019
7
8
7
8
5
7
12
10
12
17
3
3
13
6
7
12
22
10
16
21
12
18
15
6
7
4
19
19
13
26
5
15
10
16
11
52
10
22
12

541
5
4
4
5
3
4
5
5
6
8
5
5
8
2
4
5
12
3
5
13
5
9
5
2
4
5
13
8
8
20
4
6
4
7
4
29
4
8
7

.5309
.7143
.5000
.5714
.6250
.6000
.5714
.4167
.5000
.5000
.4706
.6000
.6000
.6154
.3333
.5714
.4167
.5455
.3000
.3125
.6190
.4167
.5000
.3333
.3333
.5714
.8000
.6842
.4211
.6154
.7692
.8000
.4000
.4000
.4375
.3636
.5577
.4000
.3636
.5833

.5214
.6000
.5918
.5868
.5833
.5816
.5798
.5781
.5763
.5745
.5745
.5745
.5708
.5708
.5690
.5671
.5652
.5656
.5633
.5614
.5595
.5575
.5556
.5556
.5556
.5536
.5516
.5516
.5475
.5455
.5455
.5455
.5434
.5413
.5392
.5370
.5122
.5349
.5349
.5327

.4720
.4144
.4289
.4231
.4380
.4321
.4339
.4358
.5033
.4822
.4355
.4337
.4433
.4422
.4895
.4460
.4536
.4480
.4475
.4496
.4516
.4537
.4646
.4559
.5095
.4570
.4621
.4610
.4635
.4783
.4888
.5101
.4694
.5111
.4725
.5118
.4878
.4759
.4782
.48047

3.7068**
1.6105
.4064
.7941
1.0663
.7580
.7341
-.1334
-.0206
.1237
.2917
.7502
.7053
1.2574
-.7650
.6674
-.2567
.9192
-.9380
-1.1020
1.5416
-.2579
.3012
-.9528
-.8631
.6079
1.5153
1.9521*
-.3708
.9897
2.8607**
1.2966
-.5388
-.7026
-.2801
-.9833
1.0082
-.4807
-1.0758
.7134

.5427

1.1625

2.2916**
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Over Odds Favored

Table 4.4, continued
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

(-113, 102)
(-111, 101)
(-110, -110)
(-110, 100)
(-109, -101)
(-108, -102)
(-107, -103)
(-106, -104)
(-115, -105)
(-106, -104)
(-107, -103)
(-108, -102)
(-109, -101)
(-120, 100)
(-110, 100)
(-111, 101)
(-113, 102)
(-114, 103)
(-115, 104)
(-125, 105)
(-116, 105)
(-115, 105)
(-117, 106)
(-118, 107)
(-119, 108)
(-120, 109)
(-130, 110)
(-121, 110)
(-120, 110)
(-123, 111)
(-122, 111)
(-123, 112)
(-125, 113)
(-124, 113)
(-126, 114)
(-135, 115)
(-127, 115)
(-125, 115)
(-129, 117)
(-130, 118)
(-131, 119)
(-133, 121)

13
23
12
27
11
21
11
8
9
11
8
24
11
8
31
19
18
10
13
7
18
9
12
18
13
7
6
21
6
5
8
12
11
8
7
9
5
5
5
10
5
5

6
10
6
11
7
13
3
5
6
5
3
14
8
7
15
10
10
5
7
2
9
7
9
10
6
4
6
13
5
2
4
7
8
4
3
5
3
1
3
4
3
2

.4615
.4348
.5000
.4074
.6364
.6190
.2727
.6250
.6667
.4545
.3750
.5833
.7273
.8750
.4839
.5263
.5556
.5000
.5385
.2857
.5000
.7778
.7500
.5556
.4615
.5714
1.0000
.6190
.8333
.4000
.5000
.5833
.7273
.5000
.4286
.5556
.6000
.2000
.6000
.4000
.6000
.4000

.5305
.5261
.5238
.5238
.5215
.5192
.5169
.5146
.5122
.5098
.5074
.5050
.5025
.5000
.5000
.4975
.4950
.4926
.4902
.4878
.4878
.4878
.4854
.4831
.4808
.4785
.4762
.4762
.4762
.4739
.4739
.4717
.4695
.4695
.4673
.4651
.4651
.4651
.4608
.4587
.4566
.4525

.4877
.4861
.4762
.5116
.4882
.4881
.4880
.4878
.4759
.4879
.4877
.4881
.4882
.4783
.4878
.4854
.4818
.4806
.4771
.5203
.4748
.4759
.4725
.4702
.4694
.4673
.4536
.4635
.4646
.4602
.4624
.4591
.4559
.4589
.4560
.4474
.4516
.4538
.4475
.4454
.4434
.4422

-.1884
-.4919
.1651
-1.0834
.9830
1.2007
-1.4281
.7766
1.1458
-.2211
-.6379
.9336
1.5862
2.2464**
-.0438
.3570
.6262
.1228
.4431
-1.2424
.2145
1.8133*
1.9258*
.7258
-.0570
.5522
2.6886**
1.4297
1.8110*
-.2699
.2133
.8635
1.8074*
.2333
-.1456
.6525
.6666
-1.1400
.6859
-.2891
.7048
-.1899

z_profit

2.1213**

1.7404**
1.8337**

2.5960**
1.7516**

1.7132**
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Table 4.4, continued
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

z_profit

(-135, 123)
5
2
.4000
.4484
.4355
-.1601
(-136, 124)
5
2
.4000
.4464
.4365
-.1647
(-138, 125)
6
4
.6667
.4444
.4306
1.1677
(-140, 127)
5
4
.8000
.4405
.4303
1.6698*
1.6191*
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 5 contests.
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample
averages.
When assessing the market in the aggregate, the null of market efficiency was
rejected, with the under win percentage exceeding the average break-even win proportion
needed to reject the null of profitability. Bettors would have enjoyed a positive return of
$2,400 (2% ROI) despite a failure to reject the null of profitability. When assessing the
individual odds pairings, significant deviations from market efficiency occurred in nine
scenarios. Of these nine parings, all exceeded the break-even win percentage needed to
reject the null of profitability, with eight yielding significant measures. The ROI for these
eight pairings (n = 83) equated to a net positive return of $4,977.67 (60% ROI).
Despite this outcome, it is imperative to take into account the sample size and
context when determining the relative success of Strategy 2. The 83 games that made up
the eight significant odds pairings are less than 10% of the total sample. Thus, these
inefficiencies may be more attributable to variability in the market and should not be
considered as viable predictors of future profitability. As an aside, note that seven odds
pairings that rejected the null of market efficiency when the over total was favored
compared to only two when the under total was favored. Such an outcome runs counter to
the results of Strategy 1b and further highlights the unpredictability of this market.
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Overall, this strategy should not be considered a success. As the data suggests, the
market and its players appear to appropriately consider recent performances, which
thwarts the potential for significant above average returns based on a hot-hand strategy.
Even though bettors would have enjoyed positive returns, the lack of significant and
widespread opportunities for profitability calls into question the reliability of this
strategy. This highlights the importance of assessing each game independently and
provides evidence related to the efficiency of this market and the role of bookmakers.
Ultimately, while investors and gamblers may choose to utilize previous statistics and
trend data to inform their decisions, it is evident that solely basing decisions on
correlation metrics will fail to produce substantial returns.
Strategy 3 – The Glamor Effect
Given their notoriety and popularity, glamor teams such as the Dallas Cowboys,
Los Angeles Lakers, and Chicago Blackhawks are generally overbet by members of the
public (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015). While not concerned with teams
specifically, the totals market also lends itself to the glamor effect. Even when bettors are
not fans of a specific team in a given matchup, it is common for a contest between two
popular teams (e.g., the Chicago Blackhawks and the Boston Bruins) to garner additional
over wagers. This premise is supported by Barber and Odean (2008), who hypothesized
that investors prefer attention-grabbing stocks and are more likely to invest in those that
have greater notoriety. In the NHL, this creates the potential for sentiment biases to
emerge for specific matchups that feature more popular teams, leading to the potential for
bettors’ overconfidence in high score totals. Strategy 3 focuses on this tendency for
overvaluation. Table 4.5 reports the results of this strategy.
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Table 4.5

Under Odds Favored

Strategy 3 Results
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

Totala
(-150, 136)
(-147, 134)
(-145, 125)
(-145, 132)
(-143, 130)
(-142, 129)
(-140, 120)
(-140, 127)
(-139, 126)
(-138, 125)
(-137, 124)
(-136, 124)
(-135, 115)
(-135, 123)
(-134, 122)
(-133, 121)
(-132, 120)
(-131, 119)
(-130, 110)
(-130, 118)
(-130, 120)
(-129, 117)
(-128, 116)
(-127, 115)
(-126, 114)
(-125, 105)
(-125, 113)
(-123, 112)
(-122, 111)
(-121, 110)
(-120, 100)
(-120, 109)
(-120, 110)
(-118, 107)
(-117, 106)
(-116, 105)
(-115, -105)
(-115, 104)
(-115, 104)

3929
28
30
35
45
27
43
27
42
24
37
51
33
47
68
28
58
37
58
40
94
21
47
57
54
75
47
85
76
23
75
49
73
30
43
36
57
48
73
24

2027
16
20
20
25
15
27
12
21
11
22
26
19
27
34
14
41
22
28
21
58
11
29
31
30
54
27
42
36
12
41
26
35
17
18
19
37
27
38
10

.5159
.5714
.6667
.5714
.5556
.5556
.6279
.4444
.5000
.4583
.5946
.5098
.5758
.5745
.5000
.5000
.7069
.5946
.4828
.5250
.6170
.5238
.6170
.5439
.5556
.7200
.5745
.4941
.4737
.5217
.5467
.5306
.4795
.5667
.4186
.5278
.6491
.5625
.5205
.4167

.5285
.6000
.5951
.5918
.5918
.5885
.5868
.5833
.5833
.5816
.5798
.5781
.5763
.5745
.5745
.5726
.5707
.5690
.5671
.5652
.5652
.5652
.5633
.5614
.5595
.5575
.5556
.5556
.5516
.5495
.5475
.5455
.5455
.5455
.5413
.5392
.5370
.5349
.5349
.5349

.4636
.4139
.4179
.4289
.4214
.4249
.4267
.4380
.4303
.4321
.4339
.4358
.4365
.4474
.4384
.4403
.4422
.4441
.4460
.4573
.4480
.4457
.4500
.4520
.4540
.4560
.4675
.4580
.4610
.4631
.4652
.4783
.4673
.4661
.4716
.4738
.4760
.4770
.4880
.4892

6.5740**
1.6921*
2.7630**
1.7034*
1.8231*
1.3739
2.6685**
.0680
.9128
.2596
1.9721**
1.0664
1.6128
1.7519*
1.0239
.6366
4.0592**
1.8423*
.5626
.8600
3.2954**
.7198
2.3021**
1.3943
1.4996
4.5909**
1.4693
.6681
.2223
.5644
1.4151
.7336
.2083
1.1042
-.6961
.6489
2.6174**
1.1862
.5564
-.7105

z_profit

.7989

.5473

.1824

2.0941**
.3144

1.0132
.7423

2.8334**

1.6873**
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Table 4.5, continued

Over Odds Favored

Odds Pairing
(-114, 103)
(-113, 102)
(-111, 101)
(-110, -110)
(-110, 100)
(-109, -101)
(-108, -102)
(-107, -103)
(-106, -104)
(-115, -105)
(-105, -105)
(-106, -104)
(-107, -103)
(-108, -102)
(-109, -101)
(-120, 100)
(-110, 100)
(-111, 101)
(-113, 102)
(-114, 103)
(-115, 104)
(-125, 105)
(-116, 105)
(-115, 105)
(-117, 106)
(-118, 107)
(-118, 108)
(-120, 109)
(-130, 110)
(-121, 110)
(-122, 111)
(-123, 112)
(-125, 113)
(-126, 114)
(-135, 115)
(-127, 115)
(-128, 116)
(-129, 117)
(-130, 118)
(-131, 119)
(-140, 120)
(-133, 121)

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

36
75
38
38
95
32
58
47
29
45
149
28
43
61
33
31
86
43
65
41
68
33
63
20
45
57
42
49
23
45
21
49
55
43
26
33
30
24
52
29
22
28

19
39
21
23
38
16
28
27
15
19
69
10
21
32
17
14
39
23
29
19
36
19
27
6
21
51
25
23
11
20
9
26
26
20
15
10
12
11
23
13
8
13

.5278
.5200
.5526
.6053
.4000
.5000
.4828
.5745
.5172
.42222
.4631
.3571
.4884
.5246
.5152
.4516
.4535
.5349
.4462
.4634
.5294
.5758
.4286
.3000
.4667
.8947
.5952
.4694
.4783
.4444
.4286
.5306
.4727
.4651
.5769
.3030
.4000
.4583
.4423
.4483
.3636
.4643

.5327
.5305
.5261
.5238
.5238
.5215
.5192
.5169
.5146
.5122
.5122
.5098
.5074
.5050
.5025
.5000
.5000
.4975
.4950
.4926
.4902
.4878
.4878
.4878
.4854
.4831
.4808
.4785
.4762
.4762
.4739
.4717
.4695
.4673
.4651
.4651
.4630
.4608
.4587
.4566
.4545
.4525

.4804
.4815
.4861
.4762
.4884
.4907
.4930
.4954
.4977
.5108
.5000
.4977
.4954
.4930
.4907
.4783
.4884
.4861
.4827
.4804
.4782
.4675
.4760
.4770
.4738
.4716
.4704
.4673
.4573
.4652
.4641
.4610
.4580
.4560
.4474
.4540
.4520
.4500
.4480
.4460
.4380
.4422

.5684
.6677
.8212
1.5931
-1.7232
.1052
-.1564
1.0848
.2107
-1.1891
-.9012
-1.4873
-.0916
.4931
.2810
-.2970
-.6472
.6407
-.5898
-.2183
.8454
1.2460
-.7535
-1.5847
-.0955
6.3996**
1.6210
.0294
.2022
-.2787
-.3170
.9779
.2190
.1203
1.3282
-1.7414
-.5717
.0824
-.0825
.0242
-.7026
.2355

z_profit

6.2186**
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Table 4.5, continued
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

z_profit

(-135, 123)
44
26
.5909 .4484 .4384 2.0389** 3.8217**
(-140, 127)
28
15
.5357 .4405 .4303
1.1270
(-142, 129)
21
11
.5238 .4367 .4267
.9000
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 20 contests.
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample
averages.
A sentiment bias for glamor teams assumes increased wagers on the over in
matchups that feature at least one of these teams. This scenario creates profitable returns
for the under bettor. As the results of Strategy 3 indicate, the market rejected the null of
market efficiency for 16 odds pairings. Within these 16 pairings, 11 rejected the null of
profitability, with five yielding significant outcomes (n = 291). A positive net gain of
$6,666.54 would have resulted in an ROI of 23%. In the aggregate test, the under win
percentage rejected the null of market efficiency, but failed to reject the null of
profitability. Thus, employing this strategy would have resulted in a net loss of $7,028.04
(-2% ROI).
Despite the fact that glamor teams are popularized by the mainstream media and
members of the general public, the data suggests that closing totals are inclusive of this
information. While this strategy should not be considered a success given the lack of
widespread measures of profitability, the significant measures do provide further insight
into the nature of this market, which could be useful for future studies. In particular, it
appears that glamor teams in the NHL do not carry the same weight as those in other
professional sporting leagues (e.g., NBA, NFL). Such a finding is not surprising, given
that the NHL is less popular than other mainstream sports (Gaines, 2016). Additionally, it
is important to note the relatively high frequency of significant pairings when the under

71
odds were favored. This aligns with the findings of Strategy 1b, in that wagering with the
odds appears to be more financially favorable than wagering against them. Although not
a consistent trend among the strategies tested thus far, it is one to consider.
Strategy 4 – Playoff Success and Recency Bias
In sport, past outcomes are used as a basis for decision making in situations of
uncertainty. More specifically, recent and frequent events are more easily recalled and
subsequently utilized than those that occurred further in the past and infrequently.
Strategy 4 focuses on bettors’ susceptibility to the availability heuristic and their potential
to exclude information due to the recency bias.
In the evaluation of relative team strength, a common metric utilized is prior
playoff experience. Teams who have been to the playoffs more recently are generally
viewed as being stronger and thus are likely to attract more betting action. From a totals
perspective, this means the potential for increased wagering on the over given the
propensity for recreational bettors to correlate team success with greater goal scoring
potential. Relying on this mental shortcut, however, places too great an emphasis on
recent events while failing to account for the larger context. By filtering the sample to
only include games that featured one or more playoff teams from the previous season, the
potential for inflated goal totals based on recent successes is assessed.
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Table 4.6
Strategy 4 Results

Under Odds Favored

Odds Pairing
Totala
(-150, 136)
(-147, 134)
(-145, 125)
(-145, 132)
(-143, 130)
(-142, 129)
(-140, 120)
(-140, 127)
(-139, 126)
(-138, 125)
(-137, 127)
(-136, 124)
(-135, 115)
(-135, 123)
(-134, 122)
(-133, 121)
(-132, 120)
(-131, 119)
(-130, 110)
(-130, 118)
(-130, 120)
(-129, 117)
(-128, 116)
(-127, 115)
(-126, 114)
(-125, 105)
(-125, 113)
(-123, 112)
(-122, 111)
(-121, 110)
(-120, 100)
(-120, 109)
(-120, 110)
(-119, 108)
(-118, 107)
(-117, 106)
(-116, 106)

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

4091
34
30
46
52
34
50
34
54
29
39
57
30
44
69
31
65
41
55
47
89
20
43
68
64
73
50
90
77
25
72
48
82
22
47
53
42
60

2105
14
13
23
22
20
25
22
32
12
25
28
15
24
28
16
38
24
28
26
42
13
26
40
36
45
27
49
40
15
25
28
42
13
18
28
24
30

.5144
.4118
.4333
.5000
.4231
.5882
.5000
.6471
.5926
.4138
.6410
.4912
.5000
.5455
.4058
.5161
.5846
.5854
.5091
.5532
.4719
.6500
.6047
.5882
.5625
.6164
.5400
.5444
.5195
.6000
.3472
.5833
.5122
.5909
.3830
.5283
.5714
.5000

.5279
.6000
.5951
.5918
.5918
.5885
.5868
.5833
.5833
.5816
.5798
.5781
.5763
.5745
.5745
.5726
.5708
.5690
.5671
.5652
.5652
.5652
.5633
.5614
.5595
.5575
.5556
.5556
.5516
.5495
.5475
.5455
.5455
.5455
.5434
.5413
.5392
.5370

.4647
.4139
.4179
.4235
.4214
.4249
.4267
.4380
.4303
.4287
.4307
.4918
.4336
.4474
.4384
.4403
.5104
.4441
.4434
.4536
.4892
.4457
.4475
.4520
.4540
.5114
.4646
.4580
.4610
.4631
.4635
.4783
.4673
.4661
.4694
.4716
.4738
.4748

6.3704**
-.0254
.1708
1.0496
.0245
1.9267*
1.0483
2.4575**
2.4093**
-.0149
2.6536**
-.0091
.7342
1.3080
-.5457
.8507
1.1966
1.8204*
.9804
1.3720
-.3260
1.8378*
2.0726**
2.2581**
1.7441*
1.7957*
1.0692
1.6457*
1.0300
1.3732
-1.9781
1.4573
.8150
1.1735
-1.1876
.8270
1.2674
.3914

z_profit

.7537
.1380
.7742

.2121

.7649
.5465
.4459
.0488

-.2121
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Table 4.6, continued

Over Odds Favored

Odds Pairing
(-105, -105)
(-115, -105)
(-115, 104)
(-114, 103)
(-113, 102)
(-111, 101)
(-110, -110)
(-110, 100)
(-109, -101)
(-108, -102)
(-107, -103)
(-106, -104)
(-115, 105)
(-106, -104)
(-107, -103)
(-108, -102)
(-109, -101)
(-120, 100)
(-110, 100)
(-111, 101)
(-113, 102)
(-114, 103)
(-115, 104)
(-125, 105)
(-116, 105)
(-117, 106)
(-118, 107)
(-119, 108)
(-120, 109)
(-130, 110)
(-121, 110)
(-122, 111)
(-123, 112)
(-125, 113)
(-124, 113)
(-126, 114)
(-135, 115)
(-127, 115)
(-128, 116)
(-129, 117)
(-130, 118)
(-131, 119)

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

z_profit

155
44
88
40
73
45
41
103
34
93
45
36
33
26
44
70
32
31
91
47
56
36
68
38
60
43
57
43
50
25
44
21
46
56
26
47
25
38
27
25
53
34

89
24
51
26
33
24
21
51
14
32
27
18
14
9
22
43
16
18
50
27
34
17
42
20
25
17
28
16
26
12
17
10
27
27
17
23
13
16
10
14
28
14

.5742
.5455
.5795
.6500
.4521
.5333
.5122
.4951
.4118
.3441
.6000
.5000
.4242
.3462
.5000
.6143
.5000
.5806
.5495
.4468
.6071
.4722
.6176
.5263
.4167
.3953
.4912
.3721
.5200
.4800
.3864
.4762
.5870
.4821
.6538
.4894
.5200
.4211
.3704
.5600
.5283
.4118

.5122
.5349
.5349
.5327
.5305
.5261
.5238
.5238
.5215
.5192
.5169
.5146
.5122
.5098
.5074
.5050
.5025
.5000
.4878
.4975
.4950
.4926
.4902
.4878
.4878
.4854
.4831
.4808
.4785
.4762
.4762
.4739
.4717
.4695
.4695
.4673
.4651
.4651
.4630
.4608
.4587
.4566

.4878
.4770
.4782
.4804
.4827
.4861
.4762
.4884
.4882
.4881
.4880
.4879
.4759
.4878
.4877
.4877
.4878
.4762
1.1765
.4854
.4818
.4794
.4771
.4646
.4748
.4725
.4702
.4679
.4657
.4536
.4635
.4613
.4591
.4559
.4570
.4537
.4431
.4516
.4496
.4475
.4454
.4434

2.1517**
.9093
1.9032*
2.1464**
-.5241
.6346
.4616
.1375
-.8918
-2.7780
1.5035
.1456
-.5944
-1.4445
.1628
2.1182**
.1385
1.1645
1.1765
-.5291
1.8772*
-.0866
2.3207**
.7629
-.9011
-1.1028
.3184
-1.2594
.7699
.2655
-1.0257
.1370
1.7400*
.3949
2.0153**
.4906
.7743
-.3788
-.8271
1.1314
1.2137
-.3715

1.5442*
.8400
1.4868*

1.8296**

1.6777*
2.1024**

1.5660*
1.8836**
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Table 4.6, continued
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

z_profit

(-132, 120)
21
9
.4286 .4545 .4414
-.1185
(-133, 121)
28
11
.3929 .4525 .4394
-.4965
(-134, 122)
20
9
.4500 .4505 .4375
.1131
(-135, 123)
45
18
.4000 .4484 .4355
-.4804
(-140, 127)
33
14
.4242 .4405 .4269
-.0303
(-142, 129)
23
12
.5217 .4367 .4231
.9570
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 20 contests.
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample
averages.
Overestimating the influence of recent success (e.g., recency bias) is a common
bias demonstrated by bettors and investors across markets. As the results shown in Table
4.6 suggest, the NHL totals market also provides support for this cognitive distortion.
When compared to the other strategies tested in the present work, this approach featured
the greatest number of statistical inefficiencies for individual odds pairings. Of the 85
odds pairings analyzed, 20 rejected the null for market efficiency, with all rising to a
level to reject the null of profitability. Ultimately, seven of the 20 odds pairings (n = 461)
yielded significant measures of profitability, which resulted in a positive net gain of
$9,453.58 (21% ROI). Note that these significant pairings made up only 11% of the
sample, which makes generalizing these findings difficult in a statistical sense. For the
aggregate test, the win percentage rejected the null of market efficiency but failed the test
for profitability. As a result, employing this strategy would have resulted in a net loss of
$7,964.73 (-2% ROI).
As was found to be the case for the previous three strategies, the data suggests
that the market appropriately considers teams’ recent successes and properly prices this
information. While the potential for overvaluation is present (as evidenced by the greater
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number of significant odds pairings), consistent returns or discernable patterns were not
found. Furthermore, note the frequency of odds pairings that rejected the null of market
efficiency when either the under (11) or over (8) total was favored. Unlike previous
strategies where noticeable patterns emerged, this strategy did not yield such an outcome.
This further supports the notion of market efficiency and that any consistent patterns or
deviations are likely the result of outcome variability.
Strategy 5 – The Conjunction Fallacy
The use of statistics and data analytics has become commonplace throughout the
arena of sport. Propagated by Billy Beane and his use of sabermetrics to analyze player
talent, now commonly referred to as Moneyball (Lewis, 2004), analytics have become
increasingly advanced and are now widely used to make decisions in situations of risk
and uncertainty. In recent years, this phenomenon has trickled down from sport
organizations to members of the public and more specifically, sports bettors. Successful
sports bettors (e.g., sharps or wiseguys) will argue that building models based on data and
analytics is imperative to long-term success, given that it is inherently difficult to gain a
statistical advantage in these marketplaces. The confusion that arises for many novice
bettors is the choice of which analytics to utilize as the basis for their gambling decisions.
Moreover, the larger question of whether considering such information will actually lead
to increased measures of profitability remains uncertain.
Strategy 5 focused on the large amount of analytical information that is available
to the average bettor and the notion that more information will lead to more profitable
outcomes. Commonly referred to as the conjunction fallacy, this bias exposes our desire
for more information and our perception that the more information that we are able to
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obtain, the more likely that an event will occur. Rationally, however, the simultaneous
co-occurrence of two events cannot be more than the probability of those events
occurring separately. In an efficient market, closing totals reflect all available analytic
information, thwarting any opportunity for sustained profitability based on the use of
analytics.
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Table 4.7
Strategy 5 Results

Under Odds Favored

Odds Pairing
Total
(-150, 130)
(-150, 136)
(-147, 134)
(-145, 125)
(-145, 132)
(-144, 131)
(-143, 130)
(-142, 129)
(-140, 120)
(-140, 127)
(-139, 126)
(-138, 125)
(-137, 124)
(-136, 124)
(-135, 115)
(-135, 123)
(-134, 122)
(-133, 121)
(-132, 120)
(-131, 119)
(-130, 110)
(-130, 118)
(-130, 120)
(-129, 117)
(-128, 116)
(-127, 115)
(-126, 114)
(-125, 105)
(-125, 113)
(-124, 113)
(-123, 112)
(-122, 111)
(-121, 110)
(-120, 100)
(-120, 109)
(-120, 110)

n

𝜋

𝜋%

4041 2080 .5147
23
9
.3913
26
12 .4615
21
10 .4762
37
21 .5676
43
19 .4419
20
11 .5500
32
14 .4375
38
18 .4737
35
16 .4571
54
35 .6481
22
13 .5909
38
20 .5263
46
21 .4565
29
16 .5517
50
21 .4200
69
38 .5507
31
14 .4516
65
35 .5385
39
23 .5897
64
35 .5469
45
21 .4667
90
43 .4778
24
11 .4583
46
30 .6522
62
35 .5645
63
32 .5079
75
46 .6133
54
27 .5000
94
51 .5426
23
10 .4348
81
35 .4321
24
10 .4167
75
31 .4133
53
23 .4340
89
47 .5281
22
9
.4091

G



z_mkt eff.

.5280
.6000
.6000
.5951
.5918
.5918
.5902
.5885
.5868
.5833
.5833
.5816
.5798
.5781
.5763
.5745
.5745
.5726
.5708
.5690
.5671
.5652
.5652
.5652
.5633
.5614
.5595
.5575
.5556
.5556
.5536
.5516
.5495
.5475
.5455
.5455
.5455

.4636
.4202
.4139
.4179
.4289
.4214
.4231
.4249
.4267
.4380
.4303
.4321
.4339
.4358
.4365
.4474
.4384
.4381
.4422
.4441
.4460
.4573
.4480
.4457
.4500
.4520
.4540
.4560
.4675
.4580
.4589
.4610
.4631
.4652
.4783
.4673
.4661

6.5128**
-.2804
.4931
.5411
1.7045*
.2718
1.1483
.1442
.5859
.2288
3.2339**
1.5039
1.1493
.2840
1.2509
-.3897
1.8805*
.1520
1.5629
1.8305*
1.6228
.1267
.5682
.1242
2.7568**
1.7809*
.8606
2.7361**
.0325
1.6451*
-.2321
-.5213
-.4558
-.8999
-.6456
1.1496
-.5360

z_profit

-.3004

.9661

.2620

1.2151
.0494
.9731
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Over Odds Favored

Table 4.7, continued
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

(-119, 108)
(-118, 107)
(-117, 106)
(-116, 105)
(-115, 105)
(-115, 104)
(-115, 105)
(-114, 103)
(-113, 102)
(-111, 101)
(-110, -110)
(-110, 100)
(-109, -101)
(-108, -102)
(-107, -103)
(-106, -104)
(-105, -105)
(-115, 105)
(-106, -104)
(-107, -103)
(-108, -102)
(-109, -101)
(-120, 100)
(-110, 100)
(-111, 101)
(-113, 102)
(-114, 103)
(-115, 104)
(-125, 105)
(-116, 105)
(-117, 106)
(-118, 107)
(-119, 108)
(-120, 109)
(-130, 110)
(-121, 110)
(-122, 111)
(-123, 112)
(-125, 113)
(-124, 113)
(-126, 114)
(-135, 115)

47
53
46
58
42
80
23
40
69
51
24
97
27
62
47
32
158
41
32
40
63
26
25
81
49
66
35
58
31
54
42
54
31
50
20
46
22
46
57
27
40
24

26
30
22
33
20
49
15
20
35
25
41
46
13
32
22
16
84
24
16
22
33
14
15
41
31
33
19
34
9
17
22
25
19
26
10
16
14
28
27
15
22
15

.5532
.5660
.4783
.5690
.4762
.6125
.6522
.5000
.5072
.4902
.5854
.4742
.4815
.5161
.4681
.5000
.5316
.5854
.5000
.5500
.5238
.5385
.6000
.5062
.6327
.5000
.5429
.5862
.2903
.3148
.5238
.4630
.6129
.5200
.5000
.3478
.6364
.6087
.4737
.5556
.5500
.6250

.5434
.5413
.5392
.5370
.5349
.5349
.5349
.5327
.5305
.5261
.5238
.5238
.5215
.5192
.5169
.5146
.5122
.5122
.5098
.5074
.5050
.5025
.5000
.5000
.4975
.4950
.4926
.4902
.4878
.4878
.4854
.4831
.4808
.4785
.4762
.4762
.4739
.4717
.4695
.4695
.4673
.4651

.4694
.4716
.4738
.4748
.4892
.4782
.4770
.4804
.4827
.4861
.5000
.4884
.4907
.4930
.4954
.4977
.5000
.4892
.4977
.4954
.4930
.4907
.4762
.4878
.4854
.4818
.4794
.4771
.4646
.4748
.5725
.4702
.4679
.4657
.4536
.4635
.4613
.4591
.4559
.4570
.4537
.4431

1.1506
1.3773
.0609
1.4366
-.1682
2.4047**
1.6822*
.2475
.4079
.0592
1.0932
-.2787
-.0958
.3638
-.3739
.0263
.7956
1.2323
.0263
.6913
.4887
.4871
1.2395
.3307
2.0627**
.2959
.7511
1.6639*
-1.9454
-2.3537
.6666
-.1062
1.6178
.7699
.4171
-1.5729
1.6473*
2.0359**
.2702
1.0284
1.2229
1.7942*

z_profit

1.3918*
1.1278

1.8223*

1.1640

1.0361
1.0923

.8851
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Table 4.7, continued
Odds Pairing

n

𝜋

𝜋%

G



z_mkt eff.

z_profit

(-127, 115)
39
16 .4103 .4651 .4516
-.5192
(-128, 116)
23
17 .7391 .4630 .4496 2.7918** 1.9438**
(-129, 117)
20
12 .6000 .4608 .4475
1.3717
(-130, 118)
49
26 .5306 .4587 .4454
1.1995
(-131, 119)
25
9
.3600 .4566 .4434
-.8396
(-140, 120)
21
10 .4762 .4545 .4331
.3988
(-132, 120)
20
10 .5000 .4545 .4414
.5277
(-131, 121)
22
10 .4545 .4394 .5394
.1429
(-135, 123)
41
22 .5366 .4484 .4355
1.3054
(-140, 127)
31
15 .4839 .4405 .4269
.6418
(-142, 129)
20
12 .6000 .4367 .4231
1.6008
Note. * p < .1. ** p < .05. Under odds cutoff was 20 contests.
aBreak-even win percentage and subjective probability are calculated as sample
averages.
Results for this strategy are consistent with the general premise of the conjunction
fallacy, in that more information does not improve one’s ability to make more accurate
decisions. This strategy featured a very small number of profitable odds pairings. While
the three significant outcomes yielded returns of $3,863.87 (25% ROI), the small sample
size (n = 152) does not allow for statistically valid conclusions to be drawn. When
assessing this strategy in the aggregate, bettors would have lost $7,903.30 (-2% ROI).
Given the lack of widespread opportunities for positive returns, the evidence
demonstrates that this strategy is not profitable.
The influx of data and public information available to bettors in the current
marketplace may actually hinder their potential for success. Having to consider and
process numerous analytic variables and metrics is an undoubtedly daunting task, even
for the most experienced bettor. Strategy 5 suggests that consideration all of the available
metrics may not put one on the ideal avenue for success. While this is not to suggest that
bettors and investors should completely ignore all analytic data, such information should
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not be considered in a vacuum. Rather, it should be integrated with other forms of
information (e.g., location, roster makeup, injuries, etc.) in an effort to maximize one’s
advantage in the marketplace. Therefore, while the conjunction fallacy may have been a
factor in this particular instance, the simplistic nature of this strategy and analytics
variables utilized should be considered before making definitive conclusions regarding
the use of analytics in sports betting.
Conclusion
The five strategies analyzed in the present work provide a comprehensive outlook
on the efficiency and profitability of this market. These results provide new and valuable
insights for bettors into the nature of the NHL totals market. In the aggregate, each
strategy featured a win percentage that rejected the null of market efficiency. Only one
(Strategy 2) rejected the null of profitability, ultimately yielding an insignificant outcome
(p = .2937). Based on these results, negative returns were common and substantial (see
Figure 4.3).
$2,400.46

Dollars

$5,000.00
$0.00
($5,000.00)
($10,000.00)
($15,000.00)

$(7,028.04) $(7,964.73) $(7,903.30)
$(11,612.44)
1

2

3
Strategy

4

5

Figure 4.3. Aggregate return figures for each of the five strategies analyzed.
Similarly, individual odds pairings did not feature consistently significant
outcomes and returns, which accentuates the efficient nature of the market. While the null
of market efficiency had the potential to be rejected for virtually every odds pairing (due
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in part to the stringent nature of the test), the lack of significant outcomes is what
motivated the labeling of this market as efficient. Moreover, the lack of opportunities for
sustained profitability demonstrates the importance of considering the odds associated
with each closing total when attempting to determine the success of a particular strategy.
Failure to consider these prices would have resulted in inaccurate conclusions and would
not have allowed for true profit/loss figures to be calculated.
As Figure 4.4 illustrates, only Strategy 2 produced an outcome with a net positive
return of $2,820.48. Theoretically, this strategy would be considered a market anomaly,
indicating that such a result is unlikely to occur again in the future. The remaining
strategies lost $7,028.04, $7,544.62, and $7,802.66, respectively. Therefore, when
employing all strategies simultaneously, a bettor would have lost $19,554.84 over the six
seasons analyzed. This supports the concept of market efficiency because above-average
returns, albeit present in one circumstance, were not widespread.
Significant

Non-Significant

$15,000.00
$10,000.00

Dollars

$5,000.00

$4,977.67

$9,453.58

$6,666.54

$3,863.87

$$(5,000.00)

$(2,157.19)

$(10,000.00)
$(15,000.00)

$(11,666.53)

$(13,694.58)

$(20,000.00)
2

$(16,998.20)
4

3

5

Strategy
Figure 4.4. Odds pairings return figures for Strategies 2, 3, 4, and 5. 2

2

Strategy 1 was not included in these calculations as it only featured statistical averages
and not odds-specific values.
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Considering odds pairings when determining the efficiency of this market is
imperative. B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland’s (2010) previous study that found this
market to be inefficient and profitable utilized a standard break-even win proportion of
.5238 (52.38%), which is appropriate only for flat odds (-110, 100) structures, for their
tests of profitability. Thus, their results and conclusions should be interpreted with
caution. Failure to take into account these odds pairings does not properly reflect the
market’s variable odds structure. The results of the present study concluded that the NHL
totals market was semistrong efficient, given the limited number of statistically
significant deviations from market efficiency and subsequent opportunities to achieve
above-average returns. This conclusion is further discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The National Hockey League totals market provides a unique setting for the
testing of financial theories. In this relatively simplified context where data is readily
available, theories such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis can be rigorously tested.
Thus, insights may be drawn regarding the human processing of information (e.g.,
heuristics) and the pricing of assets (e.g., contests). Previous tests of this market and
similar markets in other professional leagues have found varying degrees of inefficiency
for specific total lines, especially for high totals (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; Paul et al.,
2004; B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010). Focusing on the NHL specifically, B.
M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland (2010) found that a clear under bias existed in the
NHL totals market (2005-2006 to 2009-2010). However, this bias appears to have
diminished over time. This was hypothesized by B. M. Woodland and L. M. Woodland
(2010) and is consistent with many biases in the sports wagering and investment
literature.
This paper sought to extend the literature related to market efficiency in sports
wagering markets by including odds and expanding the data set. These additions allowed
the present research to overcome some of the limitations of previous studies. Two notable
findings will be discussed in detail in this chapter. The first is that the NHL market is
most accurately characterized as semistrong efficient. This characterization holds despite
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the rejection of the null of market efficiency for each aggregate test, because when
commissions were considered, all but one strategy yielded a negative return.
The second notable finding is the lack of influence of heuristics and heuristicbased strategies on betting outcomes. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note, while
heuristics generally provide reliable estimates, decision making biases are common and
can lead to errors in judgement and misperceptions related to probability and chance. It is
important to remember that this research does not include an exhaustive exploration of
every possible facet of the market. Thus, future investigations with the use of more recent
data have the potential to produce new findings about the influence of heuristic-based
strategies.
Efficient Market Hypothesis Discussion
The characterization of this market as largely semistrong efficient was motivated
by the lack of statistically significant outcomes for analyses of efficiency and
profitability. Moreover, individual odds pairings, which are crucial to consider, did not
feature consistent trends or above-average returns. This supports the notion of market
efficiency. Therefore, it appeared that instances of inefficiency were random with no
consistent pattern among strategies. This aligns with the conclusions of Rishe (1997),
who determined “that the betting market (as a whole) can be inefficient in both the short
run and long run, but is efficient with respect to any particular strategy” (p. 4).
Accordingly, the results of the present study indicate that bettors who employ particular
strategies should expect consistent negative returns on average. Thus, despite updated
information, data, and more sophisticated modeling techniques, the market aligns with
the premise of the EMH.
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While there are a host of potential explanations for this finding, four will be
detailed as they pertain to this market specifically. The first is the nature of totals betting
and the lack of attention that the NHL receives. From a media standpoint, the NHL is not
a central focus of the major sports networks. Rather, attention is placed primarily on the
other three major North American sports leagues (NFL, NBA, MLB), which may deter
bettors from becoming involved in the NHL markets due to unfamiliarity. From a betting
standpoint, totals betting is also largely ignored in the media discourse. Attention is rather
placed on how teams will perform against the point spread or which team will emerge the
winner of a particular matchup. Again, this may deter bettors from becoming involved in
the totals market due to a lack of understanding and awareness. Moreover, recreational
bettors are generally more interested in aligning their investments with a particular team,
rather than an overall total, which requires attention to be given to both sides of a contest.
The lack of scoring variability and the variable odds makeup of this market may
also contribute to the finding of efficiency. Aside from the MLB, the NFL and NBA
feature final scores that are oftentimes much larger than those in the NHL, which
averaged roughly 5.5 goals during the seasons analyzed in the present work. A central
tenant of investing, whether in the stock market or otherwise, is acting when prices reach
levels that suggest a statistical advantage or financial value. Such a position will
undoubtedly vary from individual to individual, as each investor is subject to his or her
own interpretation of the available data.
The absence of variability in scoring in the NHL, however, may limit the
occurrence of value plays for bettors, especially when one considers that odds are more
likely to shift than totals. For example, a bettor may find value in the following line:
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Boston Bruins at Washington Capitals: 6over+110; 6under-105
However, this advantage may be eliminated once other bettors become involved in the
market and force the bookmaker to raise the under odds from -105 to -125 in order to
balance the wagers. This new line may then read as follows:
Boston Bruins at Washington Capitals: 6over+120; 6under-125
This shift now requires a greater investment without the same return potential. What was
once a value play now simply becomes another 50/50 proposition for this particular
bettor. Thus, the lack of variability in scoring and the variable odds nature of this market,
which allows bookmakers to alter potential payouts, may contribute to the finding of
market efficiency.
From an operational standpoint, the NHL totals market features low limits and
lacks large return potential, which may thwart potential investors from becoming
involved. While this may not deter the recreational bettor, professional gamblers may
choose to invest their money elsewhere, thus eliminating the potential for large bets to
skew the market prices away from efficient values. For example, the popular online
sportsbook Bovada limits wagers on totals in the NHL to $500 per wager, the lowest of
the four major North American sports. In comparison, the Bovada limit for the NFL point
spread market is $5,000 per wager. In cases such as this, the influx of money from both
professional and recreational bettors has a greater potential to skew lines away from
efficient values.
In addition to these low limits, the lack of investor development and maturation in
this market may explain the finding of market efficiency. In financial markets, investors
are largely motived by wealth propositions and must heavily consider the amount of risk
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associated with each outcome. In betting markets, however, participants are generally
recreational, operating with stakes that are relatively small in comparison. Such factors
may contribute to decisions that are motivated by emotion rather than profit
maximization. Therefore, given the potential that there are less players and lower
financial stakes, it is likely that prices will remain largely efficient.
Heuristic Discussion
Investigating the influence of heuristics on the efficiency of the NHL totals
market was a central component of this research. As is common in many investmentbased fields, biases are expected to arise due to the nature of human cognitive processes.
One of the fundamental challenges encountered in decision making research is how to
best measure and quantify the impact of these decisions (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). The
present work aimed to formulate strategies that focus on exploiting investor biases to gain
a better understanding of if and when these biases may be influential. Moreover, with
such information it would be possible to create more directed investment models that
may provide similar insights in other markets.
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Camerer, 1989; B. M. Woodland & L. M.
Woodland, 2016; L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2015; Paul & Weinbach, 2005),
the present results indicate that heuristic-based strategies do not lead to opportunities for
profitability. Rather, it appears that the NHL market appropriately incorporated the
information that influenced each strategy, which limited the potential for consistent and
above-average returns. The only instance where a heuristic did appear to have an
influence was in Strategy 5, where the results appeared to support the notion that more
information is not necessarily beneficial when it comes to probabilistic judgments (e.g.,
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the conjunction effect). It should be stated however, that the simplistic design of this
strategy, which involved simply averaging advanced metrics to rank teams, may not
produce truly valid and generalizable conclusions.
There are four potential explanations that may account for the lack of the impact
that heuristics appear to have on this market. Given the nature of these cognitive
concepts, explanations will be largely theoretical, since the heuristics proposed by
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) which motivated the tested strategies are descriptive and
untestable in the empirical sense (Berg & Girgerenzer, 2010; Forbes, Hudson, Skerratt, &
Soufian, 2015). The first explanation has to deal with the variable odds structure
associated with each closing total. In the season wins total markets where heuristics were
found to have an influence, flat odds (-110, 100) are employed. Thus, the totals
themselves are forced to shift since the odds remain consistent. In the NHL totals market
however, the variable odds structure allows bookmakers to adjust prices without
modifying totals, which aids in the elimination of profitable avenues.
For example, in a matchup between two glamor teams, the total may be inflated
due to the popularity of the teams. If in fact, the amount of wagers (and dollars) was
significantly higher on the over side, bookmakers could adjust the odds, not the total, to
make the under price more appealing. Such an adjustment has the potential to be
beneficial to the bookmaker in two ways. First, this shift assumes that new bettors would
wager on the under, given the more attractive price affixed to the total. Second, the
financial liability of the bookmaker becomes minimized, as the increased under wagers
would aid in balancing their book. While tracking line movements such as these was
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beyond the scope of the present research, this shift in the odds may explain the lack of
inefficient closing totals.
The second explanation posits that, on average, NHL bettors are more skilled and
sophisticated than those in other leagues and betting markets. Similar to B. M. Woodland
& L. M. Woodland’s (2015) analysis of the NBA season win totals market, the finding of
economic efficiency in the present research suggest that NHL bettors are equipped to
avoid the pitfalls of heuristic-based strategies. As Reber (1996) describes, “basketball has
historically attracted the most sophisticated sports bettors, folks who are more
knowledgeable about the game than those who bet [on] football and baseball” (p. 309).
The results of this study would suggest that NHL bettors, similar to NBA bettors, are
more informed than those in the NFL. The nature of the sport and lack of widespread
popularity also makes it less attractive as an investment option than the more prevalent
American leagues. This is evidenced by the fact that totals and their associated odds
closed at relatively efficient values on a consistent basis over the six seasons evaluated in
the current study. While this claim cannot be empirically supported through solely
quantitative analysis, it is aided by the results of the present study and the apparent nature
of the individuals participating in the market.
The ambiguity of line pricing is another factor that should be considered. Prices in
gambling markets, much like those in the stock market, are vulnerable to social
influences because there are no accepted theories that definitively explain how prices are
set and adjusted (Shiller, 1984, 2015). Everyday sports bettors, who make up a large
portion of the gambling industry, operate with no models or very limited models built
around forecasting prices and outcomes. The primary issue that arises for these
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individuals is how to value and quantify new information as it is introduced into the
market. For example, an injury to a top goaltender will undoubtedly have an impact on
the line/odds set by bookmakers. While recreational bettors will likely also consider this
information, there is no objective way to know how to appropriately price such
information. Is it worth a half point on the point total (e.g., 6 to 5.5), or a drastic shift in
the odds (e.g., -110 [favorite] to +125 [underdog]), or both? Similar questions may be
raised regarding appropriate prices for glamor team matchups and the influence of prior
playoff success. The inability to objectively price this information is what may have led
to the finding of economic efficiency. If bettors had this ability, heuristic-based strategies
may be marginally more successful.
The final potential explanation centers on the concept of publicly available
information and its inclusion in prices as a part of the EMH. Despite findings that
heuristic-based strategies have produced profitable outcomes in various leagues (B. M.
Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015, 2016; L. M. Woodland & B. M. Woodland, 2015),
similar approaches were not found to be successful in the NHL totals market. This
implies that once these strategies and processes become publicly available, they are
subsequently exploited by bettors to a degree that eliminates their potential to yield
profitable measures in the future. It is important to note that such a postulation does not
suggest that these biases (e.g., failure to account for regression, recency bias, sentiment
bias, etc.) are not present, but rather that that market has appropriately considered their
influence. This aligns with a core tenant of the EMH, which suggests that prices are
inclusive of all publicly available information to the degree that technical analysis will
not permit above-average returns.
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Generalizability
The generalizability of these findings to other sport and financial markets is
limited. This section will focus on the theoretical framework of market efficiency and the
performance of the proposed betting strategies. As it relates to the EMH, the results of the
present study clearly demonstrate that this market operates efficiently. While the
significant outcomes related to market efficiency may lead members of the academic
community to refute the characterization of the market as efficient, practitioners are more
interested in financial outcomes than theoretical conclusions. Much like other sport
wagering markets, there were no opportunities for profitable returns that were sizeable
enough to warrant a six-year investment commitment. The one strategy that did feature a
positive outcome (Strategy 2), only netted roughly $2,800. Even for a beginning investor,
such a return would not warrant further use of such a strategy.
The instances of increased ROI for predicted odds pairings can largely be
explained by variability and not by predictability. Practically, it would be very difficult to
accurately apply findings related to randomly occurring specific odds pairings to future
seasons and other markets. Unless the profitability of a particular odds pairing continues
to exist over a significant period of time (e.g., 3-5 seasons) the market would remain
efficient.
The findings of this research are generalizable in the sense that they support the
theory of efficient markets. Despite the consideration of advanced metrics and strategies
built upon theories of heuristics, outcomes are ultimately decided by the coaches and
players, both of which contain the human element and thus embody a degree of
randomness that cannot be consistently predicted.
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Future Research
This study examined the efficiency of the NHL totals market and the influence
that heuristics had on betting outcomes. While research related to betting market
efficiency is far from novel, little research has directly assessed the degree to which
heuristics influence the market and its prices. This section will outline three avenues for
future research to build upon these findings.
First, the influence of heuristics has only been directly studied in the season wins
total market and now in the NHL totals market. Given the abundance of heuristics-based
literature in the various financial and investment markets, there are clear methods to
apply these concepts to other sport wagering markets. In particular, the college football
betting market may feature a degree of heuristics-based inefficiency, given the magnitude
and intensity of this particular fan base. Thus, strategies concerned with exploiting fan
loyalty in games that feature high-profile teams may lead to profitable measures.
Second, more detailed betting strategies could be articulated that center on the
wealth of publicly available metrics. This study took the simple approach of averaging
advanced metrics to rank teams from year to year. For informed bettors and investors,
analysis of more in-depth strategies would be appealing. In particular, the determination
of whether team versus player-specific statistics are more predictive would aid in strategy
and model creation. The reality is that such information is readily available, yet novices
are not equipped to appropriately assess these data. While future research is likely to vary
in its conclusions regarding these metrics, there is a market for such practical information
that could be coupled with further tests of market efficiency.
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Lastly, as is the case in financial markets, opportunities exist for new and creative
tests to be conducted that are theoretically grounded and assume efficient prices. For
example, the ambiguity of price setting and the value that certain information has to the
betting line is largely unknown. Building a model that attempts to quantify such
information, under the notion that the market operates efficiently, would be both
interesting and applicable. Another potential avenue would be to explore the predictive
power of advanced metrics, not in an effort to gain a statistical advantage in the market,
but to better understand how such information should be processed. For example, should
goaltenders be more highly valued than first-line centers? How much influence does a
top-tier goaltender have on the closing total in the NHL totals market? Such questions
have become more relevant in the present day marketplace and have the potential to
produce applicable results.
Limitations
As with any research endeavor, this research featured limitations that should be
addressed. The primary limitation lies in the assumption that sportsbook seek to balance
the books as opposed to taking a vested position in the market and against bettors. Such
an assumption is consistent with previous research and is necessary to allow for the
calculation of subjective probabilities and for accurate conclusions to be draw. However,
it would be ideal to know precisely how bookmakers operate to draw more precise
conclusions. A second limitation is the small sample size associated with the various odds
pairings in Strategy 2. The stringent nature of this test thwarted the potential to obtain
larger samples for each pairing, which may have influenced the volume of significant
outcomes. Lastly, this research included games played during lockout season of 2013
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which was shortened from 82 to 48 games. Given that above average returns were
observed only for this season (see Figure 4.1), there is the potential that its inclusion may
have had an impact on the results of the betting outcomes.
Conclusion
Sport wagering markets have evolved and grown considerably in recent years.
This rise in notoriety has created a unique line of research centered on empirical tests of
market efficiency and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. To date, only one other study has
analyzed the NHL totals market (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2010), yet it failed
to account for the variable odds associated with each closing total and did not consider
the potential influence of heuristics. By employing a more expansive data set and
focusing specifically on exploiting bettor biases (e.g., heuristics), this research sought to
provide a more detailed assessment of the NHL totals market.
Statistical tests yielded results that largely supported the EMH, in that prices
appeared to accurately reflect all publicly available information, making it difficult to
achieve above-average returns. While rejection of the initial hypothesis (HO1: 𝜋=𝜌) was
common in the aggregate, the odds-specific tests featured minimal significant outcomes.
Moreover, rarely did win percentages reach a level to reject the null of profitability and
even fewer produced profitable outcomes. While some might argue that rejection of HO1,
to any degree, would indicate an inefficient market, such an argument is misleading from
a financial perspective. In every strategy except for Strategy 2, bettors would have
experienced significant financial loss, to a degree that would generally not permit the
recreational bettor to sustain involvement in the market. Thus, given that this research is
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geared toward practical applicability, the characterization of the market as efficient was
largely motivated by these financial outcomes.
A central aim of this research was to understand whether the exploitation of
heuristics would lead to increased levels of profitability. As such, the strategies tested
were motivated by various known cognitive biases (e.g., the recency bias, the hot-hand
fallacy, the conjunction fallacy). Unlike findings for the various season wins total
markets (B. M. Woodland & L. M. Woodland, 2015, 2016; L. M. Woodland & B. M.
Woodland, 2015), heuristics did not appear to affect the behavior of bettors and the
efficiency of this market. In fact, the identified strategies would have resulted in
significant losses totaling close to $20,000. Therefore, it can be concluded that in this
market both bookmakers and bettors appropriately consider the potential for these biases
to create inefficient closing totals/odds.
The results of this research provide strong indication that the NHL market
operates efficiently and appropriately considers the potential for biases to skew closing
lines. Three explanations of these findings should be noted in particular. The first
considers the variable odds nature of the market, and the fact that bookmakers can adjust
prices quickly to achieve market efficiency. The second is the ambiguity in how
totals/odds are set. There is no published information that quantifies certain metrics and
the relative strength of particular teams. This makes the creation of tailored betting
strategies difficult. Finally, the speed at which information is incorporated into the market
is likely the primary influencer of these findings. When a bettor finds a profitable strategy
and acts upon it, such information is quickly absorbed into the market, diminishing future
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potential for profitable strategies. Thus, the above-average returns of Strategy 2 will, in
all likelihood, disappear in the future, given the rate at which information is processed.
Overall, this research provides further insight to the efficient nature of sport
wagering markets. While findings of isolated inefficiencies are not uncommon in the
literature, such outcomes rarely lead to above-average returns and invariably diminish
over time. Future research should begin to focus on how prices are set and the value of
certain types of information (e.g., injuries, prior playoff success). This would allow for
the formulation of more informed strategies, which can then be tested against the efficient
market model. As betting markets continue to grow and flourish, research related to their
financial potential will remain relevant.
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